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The Case Against Shark Repellent
Amendments: Structural Limitations
on the Enabling Concept
Ronald J. Gilson*
The tactical history of the tender offer movement resembles an
unrestrained arms race.' Faced with offeror assaults in the form of
Saturday night specials, various types of bear-hugs, godfather offers,
and block purchases, 2 target management responded with equally in-
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Roderick E. and Carla A. Hills and other friends of the Stanford Law School.
I am grateful to Lee Bollinger, Richard Buxbaum, Louis Cohen, Melvin Eisenberg, Bruce
Gitelson, Thomas Jackson, Robert Mnookin, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Gerald Rosberg, and
Kenneth Scott for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Errors, of course,
remain mine. I am also grateful to Christopher Lunding for access to his extensive file of
shark repellent amendments.
1. The military metaphor has become common in discussion of tender offer strategy.
The most elaborate and imaginative development of this theme is Lipton and Steinberger's
treatment of a takeover battle as a feudal war of the Middle Ages. Se 1 M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS vii-viii (1978).
2. A yaturda, night spbeda/ is an offer made without prior consultation with the target and
left open for only the minimum offering period. Id. at 39. The technique is intended to
minimize the target's response time and to maximize the pressure on target shareholders. A
conflict exists as to the origin of the term. Compiare Troubh, Purchased AJction." A ilme" on
Cash Tender Ofers, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 79, 86 (term arose out of General
Cable Corporation's attempt to acquire Microdot, Inc.), with Gurwin, The Scorched Earth Pol-
ify, THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1979, at 33, 34 (term attributed to public relations
man Richard Cheney as an effort to convey the impression that an offer by Colt Industries
was "cheap and that it went off quickly" (quoting Cheney)).
There are at least three variants of the bear-hug. In a classic bear-hug, the target is noti-
fied of the offeror's intention to make a tender offer at a specified price but without a concur-
rent public announcement. The strong bear-hug contemplates a simultaneous public
announcement of the offer and attempts to negotiate for the target's cooperation. The super
strong bear-hug adds to this the threat that opposition or delay by the target will result in a
decrease in the offering price. E.g., A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING 57-59 (1981); Greenhill, Structwing an O er, 32 Bus. LAw. 1305, 1308 (1977).
AgodfatheroFer is a "cash offer so rich that.., the directors do not believe... they can
reasonably refuse it." A. FLEISCHER, Supra, at 103 n.291.
A blockprhase is the preoffer accumulation of a significant position in the target's stock,
meant both to exert leverage over the target and to prevent others from joining the bidding.
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triguing defensive tactics: the black book, reverse bear-hug, sandbag,
show stopper, white knight, and, drawing directly on military jargon,
the scorched earth.' But however varied the labels given particular
defensive strategies, they share the common characteristic of being
responsive: They are available only after an offer is made and the
battle for the target's independence joined. From the target's per-
spective, what was missing from the defensive arsenal was a deter-
rent-a tactic that would convince a potential offeror not even to
attempt the attack, thereby not only saving the target the substantial
costs associated with tender offer conflicts4 but, more importantly,
eliminating the not insubstantial risk that all defenses would fail and
the offer prove successful.'
E.g., Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated Corporate
Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1679, 1683 (1979). A preoffer accumulation of target stock also
allows an unsuccessful offeror to recover at least some of the costs incurred in connection with
the offer if a competing bidder is ultimately successful. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offrs, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 871-72
(1981).
3. A black book is an outline of the actions to be taken if a tender offer should occur. E.g.,
P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER OFFERS 2 (1977).
In a reverse bear-hug, a target responds to an offer by expressing a willingness to negotiate a
friendly acquisition but at a price far in excess of that proposed by the offeror. A. FLEISCHER,
supra note 2, at 63-64; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 71.
A sandbag is intended to delay the making of a tender offer following a bear-hug. The
target agrees to negotiate, but draws out the negotiations as long as possible. Id. at 16; Reu-
ben & Elden, How to be a Target Companp, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 423, 441 (1978).
A show stopper is a lawsuit by the target seeking a permanent injunction barring the offer.
The most common claim is that the acquisition of the target will violate the antitrust laws.
E.g., Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), a 'dpercuran, 546 F.2d 25
(4th Cir. 1976). Courts have become increasingly less sympathetic to these claims because of
their obvious strategic character. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litgation
Tactics, 32 Bus. LAw. 1433, 1438 (1977).
A white knight is a third party to whom the target turns for a friendly acquisition as an
alternative to the tender offer. Because this tactic results in the loss of the target's indepen-
dence, one may question whether it is a defensive tactic or merely a negotiated surrender.
A scorched earth defense seeks to convince the offeror that the target's defense will be so
vigorous as to reduce its value to the offeror. Gurwin, supra note 2. One example of this
approach was Houghton Mifflin's success in causing its authors to advise an offeror that they
would sever their relationships with the target if the offer was successful. Id. at 37.
4. The out-of-pocket costs involved in contested tender offers can amount to the tens of
millions of dollars. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 841 n.86. Any measure of the cost of manage-
ment time would substantially increase these figures.
5. Recent statistics indicate that only a minority of target corporations remain in-
dependent following a tender offer. A study of 69 tender offers made between 1976 and 1979
found that only 13 targets (19%) were able to maintain their independence. Fleischer, Business
Judgment Rule Protects Takeover Targets, Legal Times Wash., Apr. 14, 1980, at 15, col. I (report-
ing Goldman Sachs study). Data covering the period from 1956 through June 30, 1979, show
a postoffer independence rate of only 20%. Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979, MERGERS
& AcQUISITIONS, Summer 1980, at 13, 16 (table 4).
SHARK REPELLENT AMENDMENTS
Shark repellent amendments are intended to fill this gap in a pro-
spective target's defenses. The idea is to amend the target's articles of
incorporation to make it a less desirable or more difficult acquisition,
and thereby to encourage the "shark" to seek a more appetizing or
more easily digested alternative.' If successful, however, the tactic is
not without cost. To the extent that shark repellent amendments de-
ter potential offerors, they also have the unavoidable effect of
preventing shareholder access to offers made at substantial premiums
over market price, and at the same time insulating incumbent man-
agement from the principal mechanism by which they might be dis-
lodged unwillingly from their positions.
Despite this clear conflict of interest between management and
shareholder,7 and the extensive literature cataloguing the variety of
shark repellent amendments which have been devised, there has been
little discussion of the validity of these amendments under state cor-
6. The literature concerning shark repellent amendments is extensive. E.g., E. ARANOW
& H. EiNHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 223 (1973); E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
194-96 (1977); P. DAVEY, supra note 3, at 13-14; A. FLEISCHER, supira note 2, at 6; 1 M.
LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 265; Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions:
Defending Se/f-He/pfor Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699 (1979); Cohen, Takeover
Bids: How Target Companies Fight Back, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1970, at 26; Hochman &
Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter andBy-law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAw. 537 (1979); Mullaney,
Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAw. 1441 (1970); Rose & Col-
lins, Porcupine Proposals, 12 REV. SEC. REG. 977 (1979); Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-over
Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967); Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights. New
Dimensions in Defense Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1978); Yoran, Advance Defensive
Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 AM. J. COMp. L. 531 (1973).
7. Commentators were quick to identify shark repellents when they first appeared. See,
e.g., Cary, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management from Attack, 25 Bus. LAw. 839 (1970);
Wetzel, Defensive Tactics-Who are the Goodies and Who are the Baddies?, 25 Bus. LAw. 545
(1970). Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission has required management proxy
statements to disclose the potential for shareholder injury "[s]ince at least 1969." Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 15,230, Disclosure in Proxy and Information Statements; Anti-
takeover or Similar Proposals, reiinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 81,748, at 80,985 (Oct. 13, 1978). The thrust of the required disclosure is to provide share-
holders a description of the proposed amendments' effects on control of the corporation and
on the likelihood of potential offers. For a detailed discussion of this release, see Black &
Smith, supra note 6.
The SEC again showed its concern over shark repellent amendments in Securities Act
Release No. 6159, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, Proposed Amendments to
Tender Offer Rules, reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979), where the Commission noted that shark repellent amendments
"appear[ed] to be inconsistent with the protection of investors," and requested comment with
respect to both the impact of such amendments and "the need for and type of rulemaking
action which should be taken by the Commission." Id. at 82,614.
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poration statutes.' Even where courts and commentators have raised
the issue, the inquiry either has been conclusory,9 has been diverted
to debate over the character of management's motive for seeking to
prevent a potential shift in corporate control,1° or has been trivial-
ized by limitation to technical analysis of the statutory language gov-
erning charter amendments and shareholder voting.1
In this article, I argue that these approaches cannot provide an
intelligent resolution of the conflict between management and share-
holders that is inherent in shark repellent amendments. I have else-
where argued that the validity of tender offer defensive tactics
generally turns on the structure of the modern corporation, the skele-
ton of which is described in the typical state corporation statute, but
whose substance is completed by extrastatutory influences deriving
from relationships between those participating in the corporation
and from the markets in which they and the corporation function. 12
Examination of that structure yielded a principle-that decisions
concerning tender offers must be made by shareholders 3-- which I
formalized in a rule barring, at any time after target management
"has reason to believe that a tender offer may be made," any action
that "could interfere with the success of the offer or result in the
shareholders of the target company being denied the opportunity to
tender their shares."' 4 Shark repellent amendments, however, pose a
number of problems not presented by defensive tactics generally that
not only make it impossible to apply this rule to them, but also raise
the question of whether a structural approach can be applied at all.
8. Direct judicial consideration of the validity of shark repellent amendments them-
selves is limited to three cases. See notes 129-31 infra and accompanying text. With respect to
judicial consideration of management's role in the adoption of these provisions, "[c]ase law
guidance as to the standards of conduct for directors in recommending or adopting shark-
repellent provisions is almost nonexistent." A. FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 24-4. While com-
mentators have on occasion raised one or the other issue, see, e.g., Cary, supra note 7, Smith,
supra note 6, discussion has been largely cursory.
9. "Most of these types of amendments are contrary to the basic principles of corporate
democracy." E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 6, at 195. Even eco-
nomic analysis of tender offer regulation has been moved to hyperbole by the shark repellent
phenomenon. See Fischel, Efient Capital Market TheoV, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender O Fers, 57 Tx. L. REV. 1, 30 (1978) ("These defensive charter amend-
ments seem repugnant to the most basic principles of corporate democracy.").
10. A. FLEISOHER, supra note 2, at 24-5 to -26.
11. See notes 132-72 infta and accompanying text.
12. Gilson, sup0ra note 2, at 845-48.
13. Id.; accord, Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target5s Management in Responding
to a Tender Or, 94 HARV. L. R-v. 1161 (1981) (rule of managerial passivity).
14. Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79. What constitutes "interference" and the role which
remains for target management are considered in detail in id at 865-75.
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The problem with applying my prohibitory rule is that the same
factor that accounts for shark repellent amendments' popularity-
their potential for deterrence-also counsels their adoption before an
actual offer surfaces. Because the rule does not operate until the time
of an offer, it cannot apply to the great majority of shark repellent
amendments. But while this problem merely suggests applying the
structural approach earlier in the process, another aspect of shark
repellent amendments presents a substantial barrier to applying it at
all. Unlike other defensive tactics, about which the corporate statute
is silent, the crucial characteristic of shark repellent amendments-a
supermajority vote requirement-seems to be exfiressy authorized by
typical corporate statutes.' 5 Moreover, the impact of direct statutory
authorization is magnified by the fact that shark repellent amend-
ments are for the most part adopted by the vote of the shareholders.
As a result, they come not only with a statutory invitation, but with
the additional blessing that common enabling-type statutes accord
"contractual" provisions. 6
Shark repellent amendments thus pose two types of questions for
a structural approach to corporate law. First, can this approach deal
with the problem of statutory construction posed by such express au-
thorization? Second, and more generally, can a structural approach
provide a guide to statutory construction that coherently limits the
freedom offered by an enabling approach to corporate legislation-
the freedom to "put the arrangements for the allocation of risk, con-
trol, profit, and residual ownership on a free contract basis"?' 7 In
this sense, shark repellent amendments pose the most difficult case:
Are limits appropriate even where the statute directly authorizes a
provision that the shareholders specifically have approved?
Part I of this article surveys the phenomenon of shark repellent
amendments and considers whether they can be expected to provide
the deterrent promised by their proponents. Part II critically exam-
ines traditional approaches to their validity. Having argued that
these are seriously deficient, I demonstrate in Part III that shark re-
pellent amendments are inconsistent with the structure of the mod-
ern public corporation. Part IV then considers the fact that shark
repellent amendments will have been approved by the shareholders,
and Part V suggests a means to determine which charter provisions
15. See notes 132-53 infra nd accompanying text.
16. ee text accompanying notes 193-206 infra.
17. Latty, Why Are Buiness Corporation Laws Largey "Enabling",' 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599,
601 (1965); see text accompanying notes 220-29 infra.
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should be subject to the structural prohibition. Finally, in Part VI I
sketch a structural approach to limiting the otherwise blank check an
enabling-type statute provides to redesign that structure. The reality
of electoral control by management in public corporations requires
such a limit; a structural approach can provide one.
I. A SURVEY OF THE PHENOMENON
Shark repellent amendments and the theories behind their as-
serted deterrent effect fall into three general categories. A first group
of amendments is directed at impeding a successful offeror from tak-
ing control of the target's board of directors by protecting the incum-
bency of existing management. A second group is directed at making
more difficult a second-step freezeout merger which eliminates any
nontendering shareholders. The third group is intended to deprive
the offeror of control over the total cost of the acquisition by specify-
ing the price to be paid nontendering shareholders in a freezeout
transaction or, at the extreme, by allowing nontendering sharehold-
ers to require the offeror to purchase their shares at a formula price
even if the offeror does not initiate a freezeout transaction. All three
categories of amendment will usually share a further provision-the
requirement of a supermajority shareholder vote for further amend-
ment or repeal. This Part first describes the principal features of
each category of amendment, and then considers the persuasiveness
of claims for their effectiveness.
A. The Three Categories of Shark Repellent Amendments
1. Impeding transfer of control of the board of directors.
Under a typical corporation statute, an offeror, having success-
fully tendered for a majority of a target's shares, will encounter little
delay in replacing the target's board of directors. Most corporations
elect their board of directors annually,18 without cumulative vot-
ing. 9 A new majority shareholder who is unwilling to wait until the
next annual meeting of shareholders to install his designees may re-
18. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 301(a) (West 1977); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. 2D § 36 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
19. A few states, such as California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West Supp. 1981), Illinois,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981), and North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 55-67 (1975), provide for mandatory cumulative voting. Other states allow cumu-
lative voting if the articles of incorporation so provide. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214
(1975); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 618 (McKinney 1963).
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move the incumbent directors without cause2° and select their
replacements, 2 1 either by written consent 22 or at a special sharehold-
ers' meeting called pursuant to the majority holder's request. 23
Shark repellent amendments in theory can delay this process sub-
stantially. The initial step is to classify the board into, for example,
three classes of which only one is elected annually. 24 The effect, of
course, is to require up to two annual meetings for a successful offeror
to select a majority of the board through the normal election
process. 5
But classification alone will not prevent a majority shareholder
from removing and replacing incumbent directors or, if the particu-
lar state statute bars removal of directors without cause or bars such
removal where the board is classified, 26 from "packing" the board of
directors by amending the charter or bylaws27 so that directors
elected by the offeror to fill new vacancies will constitute a majority.
Therefore, a complete set of amendments to protect the tenure and
majority of pre-offer board members must go beyond classification
and reserve to the board the sole right to determine the number of
directors and to fill any vacancies created by resignation or increase
20. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 303 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)
(Supp. 1980); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 39 (1971).
21. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 305(a) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 223 (1975).
22. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 305(b) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 211(e) (1975).
23. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 305(c) (West Supp. 1981) (meeting called by holders of
an aggregate of 5% or more of outstanding shares having right to vote); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 223(c) (1975) (meeting called by holders of at least 10% of outstanding shares having
right to vote).
24. While the corporate laws of some states allow creation of more than three classes,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.114(4) (West 1977) (not more than four); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 704(a) (McKinney 1963) (two, three, or four), both Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(d) (Supp. 1980), and the New York Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange Com-
pany Manual § A-15, at A-280 (Aug. 1, 1977), limit the number of classes to three.
25. The time necessary will be between two and three years depending on how soon
after an annual meeting the new majority shareholder acquired that status. Hochman &
Folger, sufura note 6, note that, by combining classification of the board with cumulative vot-
ing, "even a dissident shareholder who controls 70 per cent of the votes cast might, after two
successive annual meetings, find that he had been able to elect only four of the nine direc-
tors." Id. at 539.
26. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (Supp. 1980).
27. E.g., id. § 141(b) (number of directors fixed by the bylaws, "unless the certificate of
incorporation fixes the number of directors, in which case a change in the number of directors
shall be made only by amendment of the certificate"); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acrr
ANN. 2D § 36 (1971).
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in the number of directors.28 Amendments may also limit the
mechanics of "flanking" action-the call of special meetings of share-
holders and shareholders' ability to act by written consent 29 as well
as restrict removal of directors to instances of "cause" narrowly
defined. °
Even a full complement of these amendments, however, can only
delay the transfer of control. If the offeror is content to wait the pe-
riod necessary to secure control of the target's board of directors, the
protective amendments will achieve little, save for distinguishing the
target from other corporations that may not have adopted similar
measures. However, delay in the shift in control of the target's
board of directors may be a significant deterrent to making an offer.
The deterrent effect of delay can be seen through examination of
the factors that motivated the transaction in the first place. For ex-
ample, if the motive for the merger was to achieve synergy through
cost reductions (from sharing product distribution systems or elimi-
nating duplicative costs and facilities),32 then delay puts off the time
when the anticipated benefits can be realized. If the motive for the
acquisition was to displace inefficient management, delay not only
28. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of PSA, Inc. (Oct. 23, 1978), reprinted in A. FLEISCHER,
supra note 2, at 400-1. For convenience I provide, where possible, references to proxy state-
ments that have been reprinted in an accessible source.
29. E.g., id. at 400-9 to -10; Proxy Statement of Executive Industries, Inc. (May 30,
1979), reprinted in 2 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at L-3.
30. Proxy Statement of Alberto-Culver (Dec. 15, 1978), reprintedin A. FLEISCHER, supra
note 2, at 400-99, 400-106 (extract) (cause limited to conviction for a felony or "an adjudica-
tion of a court of competent jurisdiction of negligence. . . in the performance of duty to the
Company in a matter of substantial importance to the Company.').
31. See notes 100-09 inra and accompanying text.
32. The term synergy refers to the phenomenon occurring when the value of the com-
bined entity exceeds the sum of the precombination values of the acquiring and target com-
panies. See, e.g., M. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH ACQUISITION:
STRATEGIES FOR CREATING ECONOMIC VALUE 9 (1979); J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT AND POLICY 243-48 (5th ed. 1980). Two explanations for synergy are commonly
offered. The first, an operational approach, focuses on the potential for cost reductions in the
combination of complementary businesses. See, e.g., P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EF-
FECTS, POLICIES 47-74 (1975); Alberts, The Prmftabiity of Growth by Merger, in THE CORPO-
RATE MERGER 235, 247-62 (W. Alberts & J. Segall eds. 1966). The second, a financial
approach, focuses on such matters as the opportunity for transfer of working capital between
divisions in preference to outside financing and an increase in the debt capacity of the firm.
See, e.g., Lewellen,A Pure Financial Rationalefor the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J. FIN. 521 (197 1); see
alo 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 109-66 (1970); Scott,
On the Theoy of Conglomerate Mergers, 32 J. FIN. 1235 (1977). The growth of the enterprise
resulting from even synergistic acquisitions imposes organizational costs that offset these ben-
efits. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 117-31 (1975).
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postpones the expected return on the offeror's investment, but also
raises the potential that at least some of the losses suffered due to
incumbent management's inefficiency during the postoffer, precon-
trol period may prove irreversible: The loss may be of a character
that better management cannot recapture at a later date.33 Finally,
if the target's funds or cash flow was expected to repay high-interest
loans financing the acquisition, delay in being able to exercise control
may increase the cost of the acquisition.
2. Barrers to second-step transactions.
Often a tender offer represents only the first step in a plan for the
complete acquisition of the target. The second step is commonly a
merger in which any remaining minority shareholders are frozen out
of the new subsidiary.3 4 The second group of shark repellent amend-
ments is intended to make thi$ second-step transaction more difficult.
All corporate statutes require that shareholders approve a statu-
tory merger,35 and most allow the articles of incorporation to impose
a greater-than-majority vote requirement with respect to particular
transactions. The typical defensive amendment package can there-
fore impose a barrier to second-step transactions through a
supermajority shareholder vote requirement-generally from two-
thirds to as high as 95% 3 7 -for a freezeout merger or comparable
transaction 38 with a "related person"'3 9-an intricately defined term
33. See Smiley, Tender Ofers, Transactions Costs and the Theory of the Fin, 58 REV. ECON. &
STATISTICS 22, 30 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354 (1978); Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487
(1976). Where both steps are intended from the outset, and particularly where the second-
step transaction offers the minority shareholder only cash, the effect of the entire transaction
is equivalent to a one-step merger in which dissenters have only the alternative of cash ap-
praisal rights.
35. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251
(1975 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 903 (McKinney Supp. 1980); ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. 2D § 73 (Supp. 1977).
36. See note 116 infia and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. (Jan. 21, 1977), reprinted in
2 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, suipra note 1, at L-I (proposing 80% requirement); Proxy
Statement of Rubbermaid, Inc. (Mar. 24, 1978), reprintedin 2 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supira note 1, at L-2 (proposing 85% requirement); Proxy Statement of Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co. (Apr. 18, 1975), refprnedin A. FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 439, 440 (extract) (propos-
ing 95% requirement).
38. Because the form of transaction by which a minority can be frozen out is limited
only by the planner's imagination, the definition must be broad enough to prevent formal
circumvention. A typical definition is contained in the amendments adopted by PSA, Inc.:
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which will always include a successful tender offeror. The percentage
required for approval is often chosen to approximate the average
number of shares represented at the past few annual meetings,4 ° in
effect requiring an offeror to procure a virtually unanimous vote.
Since the combined shareholdings of incumbent directors, officers,
and their affiliates often approach or exceed the number of shares
necessary to block the requisite supermajority,41 these provisions may
The term "business combination" shall mean (a) any merger or consolidation
of this corporation with or into a related person, (b) any sale, lease, exchange, trans-
fer or other disposition, including without limitation, a mortgage or any other secur-
ity device, of all or any substantial part of the assets of this corporation (including
without limitation any voting securities of a subsidiary) or of a subsidiary, to a re-
lated person, (c) any merger or consolidation of a related person with or into this
corporation or a subsidiary of this corporation, (d) any sale, lease, exchange, trans-
fer or other disposition of all or any substantial part of the assets of a related person
to this corporation or a subsidiary of this corporation, (e) the issuance of any securi-
ties of this corporation or a subsidiary of this corporation to a related person, (1) the
acquisition by this corporation or a subsidiary of this corporation of any securities of
a related person, (g) any reclassification of Common Stock of this corporation, or
any recapitalization involving Common Stock of this corporation, consummated
within five years after a related person becomes a related person, and (h) any agree-
ment, contract or other arrangement providing for any of the transactions described
in this definition of business combination.
Proxy Statement of PSA, Inc., supra note 28, at 400-18.
39. A "related person" is defined in id. at 400-18 to -19.
40. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of J.M. Smucker Co. (July 25, 1977), reprinted in A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 425, 427 (extract) (supermajority requirement represents "the
average percentage of shares represented at the last five annual meetings').
41. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of Baldor Electric Co. (Mar. 30, 1979), reprinted in A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 400-21 to -25 (proposing 80% requirement; officers and directors
as a group owned 37.6%); Proxy Statement of Farm House Foods Corp. 3 (Sept. 8, 1980)
("The anti-takeover provisions will also enable the present principal shareholders [manage-
ment] of the Company, if they act as a group, to veto any proposed merger, tender offer or
other attempt to gain control of the Company."); Proxy Statement of Thomas Indus., Inc. 6
(Mar. 24, 1980) ("If the proposed amendment is adopted, the Board of Directors believes that
under present circumstances it could prevent any proposed merger or similar transaction
which, in its judgment, should be rejected.")
Management may increase the percentage required for approval by requiring that, in
addition to meeting the overall supermajority figure, the transaction also be approved by a
majority of the shareholders unrelated to the offeror. E.g., Proxy Statement of Baldor Elec-
tric Co., supra, at 400-25. The result is to increase the overall percentage required for ap-
proval as the number of shares acquired in the initial tender offer increases. Thus, if the
supermajority requirement were 66 2/3%, an offeror securing that amount would be subject
to an actual supermajority requirement of 84% (67% acquired in the initial tender plus the
17% majority of the 33% not acquired in the tender). If the offeror had acquired 80% in the
initial tender, the supermajority vote required would be 91% (80% plus the 11% majority of
the 20% not acquired in the tender).
When the strategic response of the offeror to such a provision is considered, the outcome
is ironic. Since the overall percentage approval required increases with the number of shares
acquired in the initial offer, the offeror has an incentive to acquire fewer shares at that stage.
For example, if the offeror believed 80% of the target's shares would be tendered, and if there
was a supermajority requirement of 66 2/3% plus a majority of the minority shares, the initial
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present a significant barrier to a second-step transaction by a success-
ful tender offeror.42
Anti-freezeout amendments, however, usually do not impede all
transactions falling within their complex definitions. Having
broadly defined the covered "transactions" in order to avoid circum-
vention, the amendments usually include exceptions to the
supermajority requirement to permit transactionsfavored by manage-
ment, such as a friendly takeover or other transaction not motivated
by an impending tender offer.43 These exceptions allow transactions
that are approved by a supermajority of "continuing" directors-
those who were in office at the time the related party initially ac-
quired any substantial interest in the corporation." The purpose of
that formulation, of course, is to prevent recourse to the exception by
a board of directors "packed" or otherwise controlled by the "related
person." 45
tender might then be for 51%, rather than for all of the outstanding shares. If 51% were
acquired in the initial tender, the supermajority vote required for a second-step transaction
would be 66 2/3%, of which 51% would be supplied by the offeror's shares and 16% by the
holders of the 29% who would have tendered and, presumably, would favor a second-step
transaction. A majority of nonofferor shares would require a 25% vote which also would be
supplied by the 29% who would have tendered. By comparison, a second-step transaction
following the acquisition of 60% in the initial offer would require a vote of 21% of the share-
holders to satisfy the independent majority requirement, but only 20% of the shares originally
held by those who would have tendered would remain unpurchased.
In short, the effect of a provision designed to protect minority shareholders from the risk
of a freezeout may have the effect of increasing the number of shareholders subject to that
risk.
42. This point is considered in notes 78-96 infra and accompanying text.
43. E.g., A. FLEiSCHER, supra note 2, at 21; Hochman & Folger, .supra note 6, at 550-52.
44. For example, the Proxy Statement of Thomas Industries, Inc., supra note 41, at 18,
excludes from the supermajority requirement a transaction which is:
approved by the Board of Directors of this corporation, provided that a majority of
the members of the Board of Directors voting for the approval of such transaction
were duly elected and acting members of the Board of Directors prior to the time
that such other corporation, person or other entity shall have become a beneficial
owner of more than 5% in number of the outstanding shares of stock of any class of
this corporation entitled to vote in elections of directors.
Also commonly excluded from the application of the supermajority requirement are in-
ternal corporate transactions, typically covering "business combinations" involving subsidiar-
ies of the corporation. St, e.g., Proxy Statement of PSA, Inc., supra note 28, at 400-8 to -9.
The pitfalls of drafting these provisions are demonstrated by Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d
1372 (Del. Ch. 1978), where a creative offeror sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to avoid an 80%
supermajority requirement by merging the target into a wholly owned subsidiary of the target
and using that merger, exempted from the 80% requirement by an internal transaction excep-
tion, to freeze out the minority.
45. A common variant of the exception for approval by the target's board of directors
further constrains the postacquisition board by limiting the exception to approval secured
before the acquirer became a "related person." ee, e.g., Proxy Statement of Baldor Electric
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For a variety of reasons, the ability to effect the second-step trans-
action may be quite important to the offeror. First, eliminating mi-
nority shareholders may be crucial to securing synergistic benefits
from combining the two businesses. Merging administrative and
support systems with the intent of reducing total costs by, for exam-
ple, central financing, insurance purchasing, or participation in par-
ent self-insurance programs, may pose serious problems of allocating
cost, profit, and participation where the subsidiary has minority
shareholders.4 1 Second, when too many minority shareholders re-
main, there may be nontrivial costs associated with maintaining
shareholder records and stock transfer facilities and continuing to
make the disclosures required by federal and state corporate and se-
curities laws.47 Finally, if displacement of inefficient management, or
the offeror's foresight in recognizing the target's "intrinsic" value, re-
sults in an increase in the value of the target following the tender
offer, the elimination of minority shareholders allows the offeror to
obtain that portion of the increase that might otherwise go to the
minority. 8 The second group of shark repellent amendments, there-
fore, seeks to deter by denying the offeror the benefits of the second-
step transaction.
3. Fair price and compzulso,7 redemption provisions.
Fair price amendments are a variation on the supermajority
theme. They provide another exception to a supermajority vote re-
Co., supra note 41, at 400-38. The effect of such a provision where there is no other exception
is to eliminate any discretion in the postoffer board, however composed, to waive the
supermajority requirement. In this respect the provision operates, in effect, as a "doomsday
machine."
46. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 308-09 (1976);
Borden, -oing ftive-Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987, 1018 (1974).
47. Issuers subject to reporting under § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78m (1976), are required to file, inter alia, a Form 10-K Annual Report, Form 10-Q
Quarterly Reports, and Form 8-K Current Reports. These reporting obligations are surveyed
in Securities Act Release No. 6231, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, Integration
of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, reprintedin 6 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,301 (Sept. 2,
1980). A corporation may free itself from these obligations if the number of its shareholders
drops below 300, either through deregistration pursuant to § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g)(4)
(1976), if the reporting obligation arose pursuant to § 12, or pursuant to § 15(d), id. § 78o(d),
if it arose by undertaking. There are also reporting requirements imposed by some state
corporation laws. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501 (West Supp. 1981) (mailing of annual re-
port containing balance sheet and income statement and, for corporations with more than
100 shareholders, information concerning transactions with directors and officers); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 624(e) (McKinney 1963) (mailing of balance sheet and income statement to
shareholders upon written request).
48. But see note 94 infa.
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quirement for a second-step transaction where the price to be paid
minority shareholders exceeds a specified amount which may be
greater than the price paid in the initial tender offer.49
In an important sense, fair price provisions are inconsistent with
the approach reflected in the standard supermajority provision.
Rather than strengthening the barriers to second-step transactions, a
fair price exception instead provides a way to effect the second-step
transaction, albeit at a share price that may be higher than that paid
in the initial tender offer.50 Further, it can be said that a fair price
provision, rather than reflecting management self-interest, recognizes
the potential danger to minority shareholders in second-step transac-
tions by tying the application of the supermajority requirement to
"fairness" to minority shareholders.
The position of minority shareholders following a tender offer is
also emphasized in right of redemption provisions, the newest 51 and,
so far, least popular variety of shark repellent amendment. This
49. A typical formulation waives the supermajority requirement if the price to be paid
is equal to or greater than the highest of: (1) the highest price paid by the offeror for any
shares acquired during the offer; (2) a price which reflects the same percentage premium
(based on the price of the target's stock at the time the second-step transaction was an-
nounced) as the initial offer (based on the price of the target stock at the commencement of
the initial offer); and (3) an amount determined by multiplying the largetl5 average earnings
per share over the previous four years by the offeror5 price-earnings ratio over that time. All
three alternatives are reflected in the Proxy Statement of Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., supra
note 37, at 441.
While the point of the first two price measures is apparent, the theory behind the third-
target earnings multiplied by offeror's price-earnings ratio-is somewhat obscure. During the
heyday of the conglomerates in the 1960s it was thought that the acquisition of a company
with a low price-earnings ratio by a glamour company with a high price-earnings ratio could
achieve corporate alchemy: The same earnings, from the same business, would support a
higher share price within one corporation than they would within another. If, for example,
the target had earnings of $2 per share, a price-earnings ratio of 5, and a share price of $10,
and the offeror had a price-earnings ratio of 20, the argument was that the acquisition of the
target's earnings would boost the share value of the offeror to $40. See, e.g., A. BRILOFF,
UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING 59-87 (1972); J. BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS 156-58
(1973); P. STEINER, sufra note 32, at 103-09. The third element of the price formula attempts
to capture this increase for the minority shareholder. Consistent with the efficient capital
market hypothesis, empirical evidence suggests that this form of financial synergy does not
exist. See id. at 109-27; Hong, Kaplan & Mandelker, Pooling vs. Purchase: The Eecis of ccowd-
ingfor Mergers on Stock J)ices, 53 AccT. REv. 31 (1978).
50. It has been suggested that a premium be added to the fair price determined under
the formula-for example, 50% "of the highest consolidated balance of domestic and foreign
cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities" held by the target during a specified pe-
riod--as an asset bonus. Smith, supra note 6, at 17. Additionally, the formula itself is capable
of yielding a price in excess of the initial tender price.
51. This form of provision was apparently first used by Rubbermaid. See Proxy State-
meat of Rubbermaid, Inc., suira note 37, at 400-46 to -47.
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amendment, seemingly borrowed in concept from section 209(2) of
the English Companies Act,52 allows any minority shareholder, fol-
lowing a successful offer for more than a specified percentage of the
target's outstanding shares, to require the target company to
purchase the remaining shares at a formula price that equals or may
even exceed the price paid in the tender offer.
53
52. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 209(2) (1948). Since 1929 the Companies Act has con-
tained a provision, now § 209(1), which allows an offeror securing 90% of a target's stock to
require that the remaining 10% be sold to it at the tender offer price. In 1948, § 209(2) was
added to give minority shareholders a complementary remedy. This section gives the remain-
ing shareholders in a target, following the acquisition by an offeror of in excess of 90% of the
target's outstanding shares, the right to require the offeror to purchase their shares either at
the tender price or at a court-determined price. See 1 C. SCHMrrTHOFF, PALMER'S COMPANY
LAw 865-71 (22d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as PALMER'S COMPANY LAW]; M. WEINBERG,
TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 189-91, 207-11 (3d ed. 1971). The concern evidenced in
§ 209(2) for the plight of a minority shareholder who is not frozen out is further expressed in
General Principle 13 of the London City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, PANEL ON TAKE-
OVERS & MERGERS, THE CrrY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (rev. ed. 1976), re-
printed in 3 PALMER'S COMPANY LAw, supra, at 4505, 4513, which requires "a general offer to
all other shareholders" when control shifts. This principle is given specific form in Rule 34 of
the City Code. See A. JOHNSON, THE CITY TAKE-OVER CODE 267-81 (1980).
It is interesting that the focus of regulatory concern in the United Kingdom is on the
shareholder who ir not frozen out following a tender offer, while that in the United States is on
the shareholder who ir frozen out. Compare Companies Act § 209(2), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38,
§ 209(2) (1948), with Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977); and Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34. But cf. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson &
Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (judicial concern for minority
shareholders denied access to a public market for their stock). It is hard to avoid the suspicion
that American law has made the wrong choice. On the one hand, it is difficult to identify the
additional criteria by which the "entire fairness" of a freezeout merger, whose price is fair on
an appraisal basis and which serves a corporate purpose, is to be judged. See Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981). Certainly focus on whether the minority share-
holders approved the freezeout, which seems to be a major focus in recent case law, see, e.g.,
id.; Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender OFer, 60
B.U.L. REV. 403, 448 n.307 (1980), adds nothing in light of the obvious intent of the statutory
authorization of the short form merger technique to eliminate this form of holdout. But cf.
Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (rejecting appraisal standard as
measure of damages for breach of fiduciary duty in freezeout context because appraisal does
not reflect the "gain to the corporation resulting from a statutory merger"). On the other
hand, the body of fiduciary doctrine protecting the minority shareholder in a subsidiary is
unsatisfactory at best. The explanation for the American choice may be no more complicated
than that the Singer line of cases arose at a time when Delaware corporate law was under
critical attack, see Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Refections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE J.
663, 679-83 (1974), and the fiduciary duty doctrine, always a judicial rather than a legislative
construct in Delaware, see Gilson, supra note 2, at 832-33, presented the courts an opportunity
to respond. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1354 n.2 (suggesting relationship
between Cary article and Singer decision).
53. The Rubbermaid formula specifies the redemption price as the highest of: (1) the
per share book value, (2) the highest price paid by the offeror within the previous 18 months,
and (3) the highest price at which the target stock traded within the previous 18 months.
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While a right of redemption provision focuses on the position of
the minority shareholder who does not tender, it may be a more sub-
stantial deterrent to an offeror than a fair price provision in certain
circumstances. If a potential offeror contemplates an offer for less
than 100% of a target's stock, a right of redemption provision may
remove control over the size of an offeror's total investment from its
hands. Because shareholders may in effect force a second-step trans-
action by exercising their right to require redemption, they, and not
the offeror, have the last word on the number of shares ultimately
acquired and, if the provision's pricing formula could yield a price
higher than the offer, on the price to be paid. Indeed, a fair price
provision may even deter an offeror who is willing and financially
able to tender for all the outstanding shares. If the pricing formula
assures holdouts a price no lower than the tender offer and provides
the potential of a higher price, target shareholders will be given an
incentive not to tender in the original offer.
54
Proxy Statement of Rubbermaid, Inc., supra note 37, at 400-46. It has not been uncommon in
recent years for a tender offer price to be below book value, see, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox, 380
A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977), or for the offer to be made at a price below the 18-month high. To
that extent, the redemption price could be in excess of the tender price. Moreover, the more
expansive formulas recommended for use in fair price provisions, see notes 49-50 .supra, could
be extended to right of redemption provisions.
54. This phenomenon is described with respect to a fair price provision in Hochman &
Folger, supra note 6, at 555:
Chicago Pneumatic Corporation recently had occasion to make use of its fair
price provision after learning that 5 per cent or more of its shares had been
purchased by another company. It announced to brokers that, under its fair price
provision, shareholders who chose not to sell to a raider might profit handsomely
from a higher price if a raider gains control and then attempts to squeeze out re-
maining shareholders. According to Robert Metz of the New York Times, "the
announcement--calculated to guarantee full disclosure to existing stockholders-
evidently had the desired effect. Brokers from all over the nation called Chicago
Pneumatic's headquarters in New York City and asked for copies of the charter."
(quoting Metz, Brokers Heed Stock Warning, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1978, at D-5, col. 1). The
effect might be even more pronounced in a right of redemption context since the offeror
would no longer have the option not to squeeze out the minority. The deterrent created by
right of redemption provisions is discussed in notes 97-99 infra and accompanying text.
Although not shark repellent amendments in that they are not intended to pose a deter-
rent to an offeror, social justice amendments, pioneered by Control Data, see Proxy Statement
of Control Data Corp., rept'ntted in A. FLEISCHER, sfupra note 2, at 448-I1 (extract), and more
recently adopted by McDonald's, see Proxy Statement of McDonald's Corp., reprinted in A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 448-13 (extract), warrant comment. These amendments, purport-
edly offered "in the spirit of social responsibility and justice," Proxy Statement of Control
Data Corp., sura, at 448-11, direct the board of directors, in their evaluation of an acquisi-
tion offer, to "give due consideration to all relevant factors, including without limitation the




While not themselves shark repellents, lock-up amendments are
probably the most important and in some respects the most troubling
of the amendments a potential target commonly adopts to deter un-
wanted tender offers. Consider a potential offeror's evaluation of a
target draped with the full panoply of protective amendments.
While a 95% vote may be required for a second-step transaction, un-
less the target's charter also has been amended to require a
supermajority to further amend the charter itself, a successful offeror
can eliminate the supermajority provision by the vote for charter
amendment specified in the statute-typically a simple majority.55
The carefully plotted defensive measures would then be left, like the
Maginot Line, with their guns pointing in the wrong direction. To
avoid this result, virtually all shark repellent amendments also re-
quire a supermajority vote for repeal or further amendment.
Lock-up amendments are thus the key to whatever potential for
deterrence any of the shark repellent amendments may possess.
Moreover, they highlight the central challenge shark repellents pre-
sent to traditional conceptions of corporate democracy. 56 The prob-
lem, of course, is that a 51% majority can adopt an amendment
requiring a 95% majority later to amend it; one majority can thereby
bind a future majority. Put differently, a present majority can re-
duce the value of a future majority's votes.
While this result has evoked strident criticism from some com-
mentators, the criticism has been formulated, by and large, in ideo-
logical rather than analytical terms. We are told that such provisions
the Corporation and its subsidiaries and on the communities in which the Corporation and its
subsidiaries operate or are located," id. at 448-12.
Social justice amendments do not provide a deterrent to a potential offeror, but rather
attempt to protect management from subsequent shareholder claims based on management's
rejection of an offer. Indeed, the McDonald's Corporation proxy statement proposing such
an amendment was explicit in stating that the provision was not intended "to create any
rights on behalf of franchisees, employees, suppliers, customers or any other persons." Proxy
Statement of McDonald's Corp., supra, at 448-13. While an offeror might conceivably be
deterred by the potential increase in discretion the board of directors may gain from a social
justice provision, the likelihood of deterrence seems remote at best.
One might argue, however, that the adoption of the amendment serves as a signal that
management intends to oppose vigorously any offers which might be made. See notes 100-09
infra and accompanying text.
55. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(1) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 803(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 59
(1971).
56. Because of this they received critical attention by commentators more than 10 years
ago. &e Cary, supra note 7; Wetzel, supra note 7.
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"are contrary to the basic principles of corporate democracy""7 and
that they "transform the will of the majority into what may be de-
scribed as the tyranny of the minority,"5 " but we are not told in any
precise terms what is wrong.
The absence of analytical clarity is not surprising. The issue
framed by a lock-up amendment may be viewed as the extent to
which the influence of a majority shareholder may be diluted with-
out that shareholder's consent. Where that dilution occurs when the
identity of that majority shareholder is known, there is at least some
precedent that touches on the problem. In Condec v. Lun/enheimer,5 9
an offeror had acquired a majority of the target's outstanding shares.
But before the offeror had the opportunity to pursue its advantage,
target management entered into a transaction with another suitor-a
"white knight" in today's terms-issuing the friendly suitor enough
target shares to reduce the offeror's holdings below 51%.60 Focusing
on the right of a majority holder to the benefits of its position, the
court disallowed the transaction as "clearly unwarranted because it
unjustifiably strikes at the very heart of corporate representation by
causing a stockholder with an equitable right to a majority of corpo-
rate stock to have his right to a proportionate voice and influence in
corporate affairs to be diminished.
61
The problem becomes more difficult, however, when the majority
whose "right to a proportionate voice and influence" is diminished
will come into being only at some time in the future. In other words,
the nature of the conflict is shifted from the ability of a present mi-
nority to limit a present majority, to the right of a present majority to
allow a future minority to so limit a future majority.
That the future majority is only an expectancy-the point, after
all, of an argument which responds to a complaint that it is unfair for
today's 51% to bind tomorrow's 69% by claiming that "the time for
the 69% stockholders to be heard is when the vote is taken on the
supermajority provisions ' ' 66 even though those shareholders do not
yet exist-ought not in itself to resolve the issue. As John Rawls has
stated in a broader context:
The mere difference of location in time, of something's being earlier
or later, is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less
57. E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLsTEXN, supra note 6, at 195.
58. Id.
59. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
60. Id. at 772.
61. Id. at 777.
62. Hochman & Folger, sufpra note 6, at 546.
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regard for it .... [I]n first principles ofjustice we are not allowed
to treat generations differently solefy on the grounds that they are
earlier or later in time.63
In other words, one must determine why it is desirable to favor
the present majority. A lock-up amendment does no more than to
state the favoritism and itself serves no independent purpose; it func-
tions only to facilitate the operation of the substantive provisions
whose existence it protects. Given that, the justification and validity
of lock-up amendments should be derivative-depending on that of
the underlying provisions.' If we are to allow a bias in favor of the
present majority, it must rest on a careful consideration of the struc-
ture of the corporate entity whose rules that majority seeks to alter.65
C. Ejftcagy of the Deterrent
Despite the logic underlying the expectation that shark repellent
amendments will deter potential offerors, and despite the chorus of
voices urging their adoption,66 some prominent practitioners have as-
serted that such provisions do not fulfill their promise.6 7 An exami-
63. J. RAwL.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 293, 295 (1971) (emphasis added).
64. The derivative character of lock-up amendments turns out to be of substantial value
in identifying those shark repellent amendments which are invalid. See notes 207-19 infta and
accompanying text.
65. From one perspective, the dilution of the future majority's position poses no ques-
tion of unfairness. If that dilution is perceived as unfavorable, it will reduce the value of the
company's shares to a future purchaser. The future purchaser then pays a price that reflects
the dilution, and the cost--a reduction in the value of the company's shares-is borne by the
present shareholders. See R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 302 (2d ed. 1977); Jensen
& Meckling, Theogy of the im: Managerial Behavior, Agenc Costs and Ownershi Sructure, 3 J.
FIN. EcoN. 305, 312-13 (1976). Thus, present shareholders bear the cost of their actions and
future shareholders get precisely what they pay for.
While reassuring, the argument is not persuasive. Most important, it ignores the fact of
managerial control in modern public corporations: While the shareholders bear the cost of
defensive tactics, management reaps the benefits. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 846. Viewed in
this way, the unfairness is an imposed wealth transfer from present shareholders to manage-
ment. To be sure, present shareholders-at least with respect to shark repellent amend-
ments-will have voted in favor of this result. But whether a shareholder vote eliminates the
unfairness depends on how much reliance can be placed on the proxy system as a means of
reflecting actual shareholder preference, a subject considered in the text accompanying notes
193-206 in~fa. Moreover, even if a shareholder vote were thought to reflect shareholder pref-
erences accurately, the increase in managerial discretion to diverge from profit maximization
due to reduced potential for a tender offer, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at
1174-76; Gilson supra note 2, at 845-46, represents a threat to societal interests in the efficient
allocation of resources. See Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, theftee-derproblem, andthe theory of
the corporation, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 42, 54-57 (1980).
66. See note 6 supra.
67. Indeed, Joseph Flom has characterized the approach as a "total waste of time."
Transcript, TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 443 (1978), quotedin A.
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nation of the three categories of amendments I have considered
suggests that there is substantial basis for questioning the extent of
their deterrence. While there are circumstances where shark repel-
lent amendments will have some effect, it seems clear that their po-
tential for deterrence has been substantially exaggerated."8
1. Impeding transfer of control of the board of diectors.
The deterrent effect of an incumbency amendment is premised
on the belief that immediate control of the target's board of directors
is so important to the offeror that the prospect of substantial delay in
achieving it will make a particular acquisition less attractive.69 Still,
the extent of any deterrence ultimately depends on how effective the
delaying mechanism is. Amendments seeking to delay transfer of
board control necessarily assume that the incumbent directors will
choose to remain in office and exercise the authority given them by
the shark repellent amendments to control board size and name suc-
cessor directors in a manner inconsistent with the desires of the suc-
cessful offeror. This central assumption about the behavior of
incumbent directors is open to serious question. It depends, in the
final analysis, on the potential offeror believing that even after the
offer is successful, members of the incumbent board will act in a fash-
ion inconsistent with their own self-interest.
Consider the position of a target company's incumbent directors
following a successful tender offer. A new majority shareholder now
exists who wishes to control the target's board. The incumbent
board will consist of some combination of owner-managers, 70 profes-
sional managers,71 and, increasingly, independent directors.72 Analy-
FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 7 n.23. And Martin Lipton has concluded that shark repellent
amendments' "efficacy is open to debate." I M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at
265-66; see also A. FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 6-8; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 6,
at 259. Flom and Lipton are the best known of the tender offer practitioners. See Floa Firm
Takes Over as Top Money Maker in '78, Am. Law., Feb. 1979, at 1, col. 1; Gurwin, supra note 2,
at 34 ("everyone wants one or the other [Flom or Lipton] on his side").
68. For an example of a more or less effective shark repellent amendment, see note 85
infra and accompanying text.
69. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
70. By "owner-manager" I mean an individual who is active in the management of the
corporation and who has a substantial ownership interest in the corporation.
71. By "professional managers" I mean full-time employees of the corporation, presum-
ably executive officers, who do not own a substantial portion of the corporation's stock.
72. By "independent director" I mean a person who does not earn his living directly
through salary or indirectly through business relationships from the corporation. Defining
independence more concretely, however, is difficult. One approach has been to define the
concept by exclusion. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), recently introduced by Senator
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sis suggests that none of the incumbents in these three categories has
an incentive to continue the defense by delaying the inevitable shift
in board control. An independent director should certainly recog-
nize the potential for time-consuming and expensive litigation
brought by a successful offeror intent on securing board control.
Free of the ties that may encumber other categories of directors, an
independent director has no reason to fight a fall-back action in the
face of both inevitable defeat 73 and the ideology of majority rule.
Professional management would also have little reason to go
down with the ship. Their behavior during and after a tender offer
can be expected to have a significant impact both on the likelihood
of continued employment with the target following a shift in control
of the board and on employment prospects with other firms. 4 While
loyalty and a commitment to a tenacious takeover defense could
make a manager an attractive employee to other potential targets,
one must wonder whether this extends to activity occurring after the
Howard Metzenbaum, simply requires that a majority of the members of the board of direc-
tors of the large corporations that would be subject to the bill not fall within any one of five
categories: current employees; family of executive officers; outside counsel to the corporation;
suppliers or dealers of the corporation; or individuals associated with the corporation's invest-
ment banker or other supplier of goods or services valued at more than $10,000. Id.
§ 5(b)(l)-(5). A similar approach to labeling board nominees for proxy statement purposes
was proposed but not adopted by the SEC. Securities Exchange Act Release 34-14970, Pro-
posed Rules Relating to Shareholders Communications, Shareholder Participation in the
Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, reprintedin [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,645 (July 18, 1978); see also Corporate Director's Guide-
book, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591 (1978).
The complexity of the definitional problem can be illustrated by considering the inde-
pendence of what might appear to be the prototypical independent director: a professor of
corporate law at a leading law school who has no other connection with the corporation.
Speculating on the relationship between annual director fees for a corporation of the size
covered by S. 2567 and a typical law school faculty salary, one could well wonder why the
academic-whose total annual income may depend significantly upon his or her director-
ship-is presumed economically more independent than a partner in a major law firm that
receives annual fees of $10,001 from the corporation. Seegenerall
, 
SENATE COMM. ON BANK-
ING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE
AccouNTABILrrY TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION A7-1 1, F21-44 (Comm.
Print 1980); Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1353 (1979). Even these complexities, however, raise questions concerning only economic inde-
pendence. Issues of allocation of responsibility between management and shareholders also
raise questions of ideological independence not measurable by reference to financial ties to the
corporation. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 881 n.220.
73. See notes 18-31 supra and accompanying text.
74. The operation of a market for managerial services as a constraint on the discretion
of senior management is considered in detail in Fama, Ageng Problems andthe Theog of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). See a/so R. POSNER, supra note 65, at 302; Werner, Management,




defense has failed. Moreover, professional managers remain in a po-
sition to sell their future services to the offeror, just as shareholders
sell their shares, and thereby secure a portion of the benefits of the
transaction. Because any payment for resignation from the board
would be difficult if not impossible to distinguish from a legitimate
payment for future services, the rational reaction by professional
management would be surrender, albeit at a price.7 In this sense,
the potential for delay may operate more as a means to allocate the
pie between target management and target shareholders than as a
way to discourage an offeror.
The only directors who might have an interest in holding out "to
the last man" are owner-managers--substantial shareholders and
often founders of the concern-who likely draw substantial non-
monetary benefits from their controlling positions in an independent
concern, and who simply do not look forward to evaluation of the
quality of their performance by a different owner. Even here, how-
ever, one must doubt the wisdom and, hence, the likelihood of re-
course to the mechanisms provided by incumbency amendments.
While there is an incentive to successfully defend the target's inde-
pendence, there is no reason to continue the fight-to the individ-
ual's financial disadvantage-when it has already been lost. Thus,
while a target bristling with hostility before the offer may deter even
if the individual quills are not alarming,7 6 once the offer succeeds one
would expect rational owners to secure whatever compensation they
can for their cooperation."
75. It might be possible, however, in effect to prepay existing management to act in
what would otherwise be an irrational manner. If, for example, target management were
given employment contracts guaranteeing, in the event of a successful takeover, either their
continued employment at a substantial salary or the right to quit and receive a substantial
lump-sum payment, an offeror might have reason to believe that the fight would continue to
the bitter end. The target would, of course, encounter a problem of moral hazard; at some
point the lump-sum payment following takeover becomes more attractive than continued
control. A classic example of this phenomenon is the recent award of what have been styled
"golden parachutes" to top executives of Conoco, Inc. Following the expression of interest in
the company by such suitors as Seagram Co., Cities Service Co., and Texaco Inc., new em-
ployment contracts were awarded to senior management granting the chairman of the board,
for example, the right to quit and receive a $5,000,000 lump-sum payment if Conoco were
taken over. Conoco Protects Nine oflis Top Ojiers With Takover Compensation Agreements, WalL St.
J., July 9, 1981, at 4, col. 2. This arrangement would be prohibited by my rule barring
postoffer defensive tactics. Se Gilson, supra note 2, at 879.
76. The information content, in contrast to the operative effect, of shark repellent
amendments is considered in notes 100-09 injra and accompanying text.
77. The common phenomenon of target management turning to a white knight follow-
ing an initial offer, and the fact that a company that is a raider in one transaction may be a
white knight in the next, suggest the accuracy of this prediction.
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In sum, the logic underlying the asserted deterrent effect of char-
ter amendments designed to impede transfer of control of the board
of directors is substantially flawed because it is based on the expecta-
tion that incumbent directors will act irrationally.
2. Barriers to second-step transactions.
Effectiveness in preventing freezeout mergers. Because its effectiveness
does not depend on the behavior of individuals whose self-interest is
inconsistent with the desired result, an amendment preventing sec-
ond-step transactions has more promise as a deterrent than one di-
rected at maintaining the incumbent board of directors. If a
supermajority requirement for a second-step transaction is waivable
only by "continuing directors"---effectively the preoffer board-the
resignation or replacement of the incumbent board will not render
the amendment ineffective. In that event the supermajority require-
ment may not be waivable at all.
78
Because the goal of an offeror to whom a second-step transaction
is important is, by definition, to acquire all of the target's stock,79 the
initial impact of a supermajority amendment-to cause the offeror to
increase the number of shares sought by tender to an amount in ex-
cess of the supermajority required-is not itself a serious burden.
The potential for deterrence arises, however, from the possible in-
crease in the total cost of the transaction even if the offeror had in-
tended to pay the same price in the second-step transaction. If the
supply curve for the target's stock is upward-sloping, the need to ac-
quire a greater number of shares will result in an increased price not
only for the marginal shares acquired due to the supermajority re-
quirement, but, because the Williams Act requires the same price to
be paid for all shares tendered,80 for the original shares as well.81
78. This conclusion depends, of course, on the presence of a lock-up amendment. See
notes 55-65 supra and accompanying text.
79. There is no need to consider the impact of a supermajority amendment on an of-
feror with no intention of a second-step transaction; obviously the amendment could have no
deterrent effect in that setting.
80. See Securities Act Release No. 6159, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,385,
supra note 7 (interpreting Exchange Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976), to require
the same price be paid for all shares).
81. The notion of an upward-sloping supply curve for the target's stock is not inconsis-
tent with existing empirical evidence suggesting that because shares of stock represent only a
right to a future income stream with a particular risk-return relationship, as to which a multi-
tude of substitutes exist, more or less of a security can be purchased without a resulting
change in price. Scholes, The Marketfor Securiiies: Substitution versus Prtice Pressure and the Ef cts of
Information on Share Pices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972). Professor Scholes points out that particular
purchases or sales may reflect new information concerning the issuer which warrants altera-
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The alteration in offeror strategy required by a supermajority
provision may also increase the cost of the total transaction through
its impact on the type of consideration used and the amount of
financing necessary for the complete acquisition of the target. It is
not uncommon for an offeror to make an initial cash tender offer for
a bare majority of the target's outstanding shares, expecting that its
securities will be the consideration in the second-step transaction.'
2
This approach reduces the cash cost of the acquisition to the offeror
and benefits the target shareholders by providing them the option of
a tax-free exchange. 83 Increasing the number of shares that must be
acquired in the initial offer to satisfy the supermajority requirement
raises the cash cost of the acquisition and, necessarily, the cost of the
financing necessary to complete it. It may also reduce the opportu-
nity to offer target shareholders the choice between a taxable and
tax-free exchange, a benefit which presumably must be replaced if
the transaction is to remain equally attractive to shareholders.
The deterrent potential of supermajority amendments obviously
increases where target management itself owns or controls enough
shares to block the supermajority vote even if the offeror tenders for
all the outstanding shares.8 4 However, as with the efficacy of shark
tion in the price of its shares relative to substitutes. A tender offer may be the most extreme
example since the offer to purchase reflects information that, for at least one buyer, there are
no substitutes for the security, thus allowing a much greater role for price as opposed to
substitution effects.
82. See, e.g., Freund & Easton, supra note 2; Nathan, Developments in Strategies and Tactics
for Oferors in Merger, Tender Ofer, and Similar Acquisition Transactions, in TENTH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON SECURIIES REGULATION 257 (1979).
83. One attraction of a cash tender offer for a portion of the target's shares followed by a
second-step merger in which the consideration offered would be the offeror's securities is to
allow target shareholders to choose between a taxable and tax-free transaction. Shareholders
electing to tender their shares in the initial cash offer would recognize gain or loss on the sale.
Under current standards, the second-step merger would still qualify as an "A" reorganization,
see I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1976), with the result that target shareholders participating in the
second-step transaction would not recognize gain or loss on their receipt of offeror securities,
so long as approximately 50% of the target's securities are acquired in exchange for the of-
feror's securities in order to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine. See Rev. Proc. 77-37,
1977-2 C.B. 568; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 115-18 (Supp. 1979).
For a discussion of other techniques intended to allow shareholders an individual choice
between recognition and nonrecognition, see Bowen, Corporate Acquisition Techniques, 32 MA-
JOR TAX PLAN. 101.3 (1980); Milefsky, The Hybid Acquiition" A New Tax Concept in Acquisi-
tion Planning, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1980, at 23.
84. See note 41 supra. A review of the disclosures in the proxy statements referred to in
note 41, as well as that in others in which management holdings, while insufficient alone to
block a supermajority vote, are large enough to provide an effective veto, reveals wide variety
in the manner in which management's control is disclosed or, indeed, whether it is specifically
disclosed at all. It is impossible to determine whether the difference in disclosure with respect
to an obviously material fact results from differing quality of staff review of particular proxy
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repellent amendments protecting the incumbent board of directors,
the deterrent effect of management power to block a second-step
transaction depends not only on the existence of the power, but also
on the offeror's evaluation of management's will to use it in the face
of a successful tender offer for a controlling, but not supermajority,
interest. From this perspective, it must be kept in mind that target
management pays a substantial price by exercising its power to block
the second-step transaction. While such an action prevents the of-
feror from securing the potential benefits from eliminating minority
shareholders, members of management will then remain minority
shareholders with sharply reduced opportunities to liquidate their in-
vestment. Thus, the deterrent effect of the provision again depends,
in part, on the offeror's willingness to believe that management will
act in a financially irrational manner. Indeed, if one assumes that
management's investment in the shares used to block the
supermajority vote represents a significant portion of each manager's
assets-a not unreasonable assumption with respect to professional
management-the behavior necessary for the provision to operate as
an effective deterrent is even more irrational than for incumbency
amendments.
Importance of second-step transactions. Evaluation of the deterrence
created by supermajority requirements thus far has assumed that the
availability of second-step transactions is critical to the offeror. To
the extent this assumption overstates the importance of these transac-
tions to the offeror, the potential deterrence of even a perfectly effec-
tive amendment85 is reduced. In fact, on examination the reasons
commonly offered for the desirability of a second-step transaction,86
although real, hardly seem compelling. The constraints on a parent's
discretion in allocating synergistic benefits between itself and its sub-
sidiary with public shareholders do not appear to be substantial.8 1
statements despite the standards imposed in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,230,
supra note 7, or whether issuers are taking advantage of the fact that proxy material, unlike
registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, need not be declared effective by the
SEC, but may be sent to shareholders, regardless of the character of staff comments, following
a 10-day waiting period. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1981).
85. One can imagine a form of shark repellent that could be effective at blocking a
second-step transaction. A very high vote requirement together with a requirement for ap-
proval by a majority of nontendering shareholders, see note 41 supra, and with no exceptions
other than approval by the target board prior to the offeror's acquisition of a significant
percentage of target shares, see note 45 supra, might make a second-step transaction impossible
even if target management conceded after the success of the initial offer.
86. See notes 46-48 sura and accompanying text.
87. See note 93 infra.
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The administrative costs associated with public shareholders, while
nontrivial,"8 are hardly large enough to affect a transaction of signifi-
cant size. Finally, the available empirical evidence strongly suggests
that the offeror's return comes from the right "to control . . . the
target's resources,"819 not from a postoffer increase in the value of the
target's shares.9° This, of course, would counsel against a second-step
transaction, because once the offeror achieves control, its rate of re-
turn on the investment may well decrease with the purchase of addi-
tional shares.
Nonetheless, from a different perspective of the tender offer pro-
cess, the ability to effect a second-step transaction may retain its im-
portance. That an offer is made reflects the offeror's view that after
completion of the transaction the value of the shares acquired will
exceed the price to be paid.91 A rational shareholder might then de-
cide not to tender, but to "free-ride" on the offer. Thus, one might
argue that the ability to freeze out these free-riders at a price not
reflecting the offeror's anticipated profits is crucial to the offer's
success.
92
But a second-step transaction is not the only way to prevent tar-
get shareholders from free-riding on the offeror's profits. Whether an
offeror's anticipated profit results from synergy or the displacement
of inefficient management, current case law presents little barrier to
88. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
89. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender
Offers, 23 J.L. & EcON. 371, 381-82 (1980).
90. See note 94 infra.
91. The condition commonly considered necessary to induce a tender offer is that the
value to the offeror of the shares acquired exceeds the price paid plus transaction costs. See,
e.g., Grossman & Hart, sura note 65; Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash
Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN. 505 (1978); Smiley, Tender Offers, Transactions Costs and the Theoy ofthe
Fin, 58 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 22 (1976).
92. Grossman & Hart, sura note 65, argue that no takeover will occur unless the value
of the shares after the offer exceeds the price paid by the offeror plus transaction costs. But
this excess
represents a profit shareholders could have made if they had not tendered their
shares to the raider. In particular, suppose each shareholder is so small that his
tender decision will not affect the outcome of the raid. Then, if a shareholder thinks
that the raid will succeed and that the raider will improve the firm, he will not
tender his shares, but will instead retain them, because he anticipates a profit from
their price appreciation.
Id. at 43. The authors argue that no takeovers will succeed in the absence of mechanisms to
discourage free-riders. The ability to eliminate minority shareholders at a price that does not
reflect the increased value resulting from the transaction is the most obvious means to do this.
Grossman and Hart argue that the incentive to make a tender offer at a premium is reduced




the offeror's retaining a disproportionate amount of the profit. 93 An-
ticipation of such behavior by the offeror should dissuade target
shareholders from free-riding in expectation of an increase in the
price of their shares following a successful tender. Empirical investi-
gation is consistent with this analysis, suggesting that the market
price of a target's stock following a successful offer drops below the
offer price,9 4 and that the offeror's gain results from an increase in the
value of its own stock, an increase in which the minority cannot share
by free-riding.93
In sum, shark repellent amendments creating a barrier to second-
step transactions have more promise as a deterrent than incumbency
amendments. The significance of this barrier is attenuated by the
reality facing target management when an offeror secures majority,
but not supermajority, control, and by doubts about the overall im-
portance of the second-step transaction to the offeror. Still, to the
extent that a second-step transaction is desirable, these provisions re-
tain the potential, because of Williams Act requirements, for dispro-
portionately increasing the cost of the offer by increasing the number
of shares an offeror must acquire to accomplish it.96
3. Fair price and compulsoqy redemption provisions.
Fair price amendments act as a backstop to supermajority barri-
ers to second-step transactions. Although they can help the overall
93. The opportunities for a parent company to favor itself at the expense of the subsidi-
ary are legion, and "[t]he checks on unfair dealing by the parent are few. In theory, of course,
the fairness of the parent's behavioris subject to the check ofjudicial review; but in practice
such review is difficult even where the courts have the will to engage in it, and they often lack
the will." M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 309 (citations omitted); see Brudney, Ejtient Mar-
kets andFair Values in Parent Subsidia Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63, 69-71 (1978); Gary, supra note
52, at 679-83.
94. The data concerning the size of the premium paid in a tender offer, and the extent
of the postoffer increase in the price of the target's stock, are consistent with the offeror ac-
cording itself, presumably through inter-company transactions and charges, a disproportion-
ate share of the benefits resulting from the acquisition. If the offeror gained only through the
increased value of the target's stock following the acquisition, the postoffer value of target
stock would have to exceed the price paid by the offeror. Minority shareholders would then
share equally with the offeror in the gains resulting from the transaction. In fact, postoffer
prices average some 13% below the tender price, Bradley, Interfom Tender Offers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 364 (1980), strongly suggesting that offerors gain from the
acquisition in ways which exclude the participation of minority shareholders. For an exami-
nation of this evidence and its relationship to an offeror's motivation for engaging in the
transaction, see Gilson, supra note 2, at 873-75.
95. Under this explanation, the increase in the price of the offeror's stock results from
the "right to control of the target's resources." Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 89, at 381-82.
96. See notes 80-81 sura and accompanying text.
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package of amendments to appear more balanced by providing a
means to avoid the supermajority requirement, the formulas con-
tained in these amendments may increase the price required to be
paid in the second-step transaction, perhaps to a level above the ini-
tial tender price, so that the option is illusory. Because fair price
amendments focus only on second-step transactions, their effective-
ness as a deterrent, like that of supermajority requirements generally,
depends on the belief that target management will choose to enforce
the requirements, on the size of the resulting increase in total acquisi-
tion cost, and ultimately on the overall importance of a second-step
transaction to the offeror.
Right of redemption provisions, in contrast, promise greater de-
terrence than either supermajority or fair price amendments. Like
fair price amendments, right of redemption provisions make the en-
tire acquisition more expensive by increasing the price of the second-
step transaction. But they go a step further by removing the offeror's
alternative of not proceeding with a second-step transaction if its cost
appears too great or its benefits too small. Right of redemption pro-
visions thereby institutionalize the free-rider problem that I argued
was not significant with respect to second-step transactions alone. If
shareholders understand that a successful tender offer will give them
the right to demand a higher price for their shares-a fact target
management might be expected to disseminate with enthusiasm9 7 -
there is no avoiding the incentive to hold out in the hope that other
shareholders will tender and the offer will succeed.98
97. See note 54 supra.
98. The classic example is that of a closed-end mutual fund. Although the only assets
held by the fund are the securities of other companies, so that net asset value and liquidation
value are virtually identical, the securities of many of them, for significant periods of time,
have traded at a price below net asset value. S&egeneral'y Boudreaux, Disouts andPrnemiums on
Closed-End Mutual Funds: A Study in Valuation, 28 J. FIN. 515 (1973); Malkiel, The Valuation of
Closed-End Investment-Company Shares, 32 J. FIN. 847 (1977); Mendelson, Closed-End Fund Dis-
counts Revisited, 2 FIN. Rav. 48 (1978). Thus, one acquiring control of the fund at market
price and liquidating it would profit by the amount of the pre-existing discount from net asset
value. But a shareholder who believed that the offer would be successful would refuse to sell
for a premium less than the full discount since, on liquidation, the shareholder would receive
the full benefit. Grossman & Hart, sura note 65, at 57. Bradley argues that an offeror can
avoid this quandary and profit from the transaction despite the discount to target sharehold-
ers, because "the acquisition yields an interactive (synergistic) gain that can be shared by the
stockholders of both firms." Bradley, supra note 94, at 354 n.9. The difficulty with this expla-
nation is that because the fund's assets are solely other securities, and because elimination of
the discount is based on the expectation that the fund will be liquidated, it is unlikely that the
transaction will have the synergistic effect of increasing the value of the existing assets of the
offeror. While one might suggest that the offeror gains through an ability to earn future
income as the fund's investment adviser following the transaction, see Rosenfeld v. Black, 445
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Thus, of the categories of shark repellent amendments, right of
redemption provisions, the type least frequently adopted, present the
greatest potential for deterring an offeror.99
4. Shark repellent amendments as "corporate signals."
I have demonstrated that the direct deterrent effect of the most
common shark repellent amendments has been greatly exaggerated.
But even where shark repellent amendments are not effective on their
own terms, there is an argument that they may nonetheless serve to
steer offerors away. The idea is that their deterrence derives not from
the actual effect of the amendments, but from what the amendments
suggest about the target's future actions. This view of shark repellent
amendments is based upon developments in "signaling theory,"
which posits that the information value of certain corporate behavior
is not in the action taken, but in what that action "signals" about
attributes of the corporation not otherwise discernible at that time.100
Thus, for example, it is argued that investors may respond favorably
to a more highly leveraged financial structure, despite the accepted
theory that firm value is determined by the present value of future
income streams regardless of the firm's debt-equity ratio,"10 if inves-
tors perceive that increased leverage reflects that management has
F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dirmissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972), that explanation is inconsistent
with elimination of the discount through liquidation, although it is possible if the discount is
eliminated through conversion to an open-end fund.
99. It is interesting that the form of shark repellent amendment most likely to be an
effective deterrent is also the one that is most justifiable from the perspective of target share-
holders. The available empirical evidence strongly suggests that the principal source of gain
for the acquiring corporation is the allocation to itself of a disproportionate amount of the
benefits arising from the transaction. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 874-75; note 94 supra. The
right of redemption provision can be responsive to the plight of the "frozen-in" shareholder.
See note 52 supra.
100. For the application of signaling theory in a variety of contexts, see, e.g., A. SPENCE,
MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING
PROCESSES (1974); Akerlof, Yhe Market/for 'Zemons' " Qali, Uncertaing and the Market Meha-
nwmn, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Gonedes, Corporate Signaling, Exlenal Accounting, and Capital
Market Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinag Items, 16 J. Accr. RESEARCH
26 (1978); Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FN. 323 (1980); Ross,
Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications ofModem Finance Theo.7 and Signaling The-
og, in IssuES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (F. Edwards ed. 1979); Ross, The Determination
ofFinancial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Ross, Determination of Fnandal Structure].
101. The text restates broadly the Modigliani-Miller irrelevancy propositions. See
Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Foligy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961);
Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theoy ofInvetment, 48 AM.
ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
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favorable nonpublic information about the firm's future. 10 2
In the context of defensive tactics, the signaling argument is that
even though everyone knows that shark repellent amendments will
not themselves deter an otherwise interested offeror, they do repre-
sent a way in which management can communicate to the universe
of potential offerors before an offer is made, and therefore at a time
when the communication can still affect the potential offeror's behav-
ior. The message is simply that the company intends to defend itself
vigorously against any offer. While the shark repellent amendments
themselves may not be effective, their adoption tells the potential of-
feror that other action, which cannot be taken until an offer is
made-such as a scorched earth defense-will be undertaken.10 3
This application of signaling theory is questionable. For a signal
to be effective-to "reflect information about the unobservable at-
tributes of firms' decisions"' 4 -it must be clear what attribute is be-
ing disclosed. No clear message appears to be sent by adoption of
shark repellent amendments. While some commentators state that
shark repellent amendments have an "in terrorem effect: . . . a signal
to a would-be raider that it might better look elsewhere if it wishes to
avoid a spirited struggle,"105 others suggest that their adoption is a
sign of weakness, and testify to a "growing feeling that . . . these
charter provisions are counter-productive in that they call attention
to the company as a prospective target."10 6 A further condition to a
signal's effectiveness is that it must "facilitate distinguishing between
firms whose decisions have different unobservable characteristics."10 7
The difficulty with shark repellent amendments is their popular-
ity;' °s as more and more firms adopt them, they no longer distinguish
between firms that will react passively and those that will react ag-
102. Ross, Determination ofFinancial Slrwture, upra note 100, at 25. This position is ar-
guably consistent with the Modigliani-Miller irrelevancy propositions since the propositions
only apply to firms of a common risk class. The effect of the signals inherent in the financial
structure, it is argued, is to shift "the market's perception of the firm's risk class." Id. at 36.
For a criticism of this approach from the perspective of a securities lawyer, see Kripke, Com-
meniag,, in Issuss IN F cANciAL REGULATION, supra note 100, at 203.
103. E.g., Hochman & Folger, sufpra note 6, at 537; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 110 (1979).
104. Gonedes, supra note 100, at 27.
105. Hochman & Folger, supra note 6, at 537.
106. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, sufpra note 1, at 266.
107. Gonedes, sura note 100, at 30.
108. Black and Smith, supra note 6, report that between 1972 and 1978, 199 companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange adopted supermajority provisions of one sort or an-
other. Id. at 713 n.51.
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gressively, and so the value of the signal diminishes.'0 9
My review of shark repellent amendments demonstrates that the
most common amendments are likely to be very weak deterrents.
But that is not to say that they are unimportant. Tender offer deci-
sions, like all business choices, are made at the margin. An increase
in acquisition costs resulting from shark repellent amendments need
not alone make a proposed acquisition undesirable; it need only be
the last straw. Thus, even largely ineffective shark repellent amend-
ments may deter a particular transaction in some circumstances, to
the detriment of the target's shareholders." 0 If that result can be
avoided without substantial regulatory cost, the effort is worthwhile.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO SHARK REPELLENT
AMENDMENTS: ATTACK AND DEFENSE
Unlike other defensive tactics,"' most shark repellent amend-
109. In light of recent developments in statistical methods, it is now possible to deter-
mine empirically whether the market believes that the adoption of shark repellent amend-
ments reduces the likelihood of a future tender offer-whether because of the effectiveness of
the amendments themselves, or because adoption carries with it information concerning man-
agement's intentions if a tender offer is made. Because any future offer would be made at a
premium, the preadoption market price of the company's stock should reflect the expected
premium discounted by estimates of the probability of an offer and of how far in the future
the offer will occur. Thus, the adoption of a shark repellent amendment should result in a
decrease in the price of the stock relative to the market as a whole if adoption is believed to
reduce the likelihood of a future premium offer. Using what is called the "market model," see,
e.g., E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 63-132 (1976); G. FOSTER, FINANCIAL STATE-
MENT ANALYsis 362-65 (1978), one can distinguish the impact on price caused by the adop-
tion of the shark repellent amendment from that of other events affecting the company.
An effort of this sort was attempted by H. DeAngelo & E. Rice, Anti-Takeover Charter
Amendments and Stockholder Wealth (Working Paper No. 7, Graduate School of Business
Administration, University of Washington) (1980), with a sample of amendments adopted by
87 companies between 1974 and 1979. Their evidence indicated a slight decrease in returns
to companies adopting shark repellent amendments, but the decrease was not statistically
significant. While this is consistent with my conclusion that shark repellent amendments are
unlikely to be very effective, the DeAngelo & Rice study is sufficiently flawed that its results
cannot be taken as conclusive. Among other difficulties with the design of the study, approxi-
mately 15% of the sample consisted of charter amendments involving o,y incumbency provi-
sions, which, I have argued, are the least likely to deter a potential offeror. See notes 69-77
supra and accompanying text. In addition, some amendments in the sample did not include a
lock-up provision. H. DeAngelo & E. Rice, supra, at 23. Since it is only the presence of a lock-
up amendment or a comparable statutory provision, see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616
(McKinney 1963), that provides even the potential for deterrence, see notes 55-65 supra and
accompanying text, this problem would also bias the results toward ineffectiveness.
110. Gilson, supra note 2, at 848-65, and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at
1182-94, rebut arguments that deterring tender offers in one fashion or another benefits tar-
get shareholders.
11. See Gilson, suira note 2, at 826-31.
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ments have the advantage of clarity of intent: Their only purpose is
to reallocate decisionmaking power over tender offers in favor of
management. A typical proxy statement disclosure states that the
proposed shark repellent amendments "are designed to discourage
any attempt to obtain control of [the target] in a transaction which is
not approved by [the] Board of Directors."' 1 2 The unavoidable con-
sequence of this reallocation is to make incumbent managers more
secure in their positions: "[S]uch amendments may result in the in-
cumbent officers and directors . . . retaining their positions even
though stockholders holding a majority of shares desire a change."'113
Management's role in the adoption of shark repellent amendments-
whether by investing corporate resources in their development, by
using proxy machinery to solicit their approval, or simply by recom-
mending their adoption-therefore raises the question of whether
management has acted in its own interest at the expense of the share-
holders. In traditional terms, the obvious attack on management's
activities would be framed in terms of a violation of fiduciary duty.
The obvious response is also traditional. The corporate statutes
of most states expressly authorize the most common forms of shark
repellent amendments. In modern "enabling act" statutes, 14 phrases
such as "unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation"
qualify almost all prescriptive provisions, lr5 and all major statutes
expressly authorize supermajority voting requirements.1 ' Subject
only to compliance with the required formalities concerning amend-
ing the articles of incorporation,1 17 it would be argued, the validity of
112. Proxy Statement of PSA, Inc., supra note 28, at 400-4. Similar statements appear
in the proxy statements of many companies proposing shark repellent amendments. See, e.g.,
Proxy Statement of Baldor Electric Co., supra note 41, at 400-23 to -24; Proxy Statement of
Ozark Airlines 4 (Apr. 16, 1979); Proxy Statement of Sterling Precision Corp. 14-15, 16 (Aug.
23, 1979).
113. Proxy Statement of PSA, Inc., supra note 28; see Proxy Statement of Sterling Preci-
sion Corp., supra note 112, at 18.
114. An "enabling act" is one that explicitly allows those forming a corporation the
freedom to structure their arrangement as they choose, "put[ting] the arrangements for the
allocation of risk, control, profit, and residual ownership on a free contract basis," Latty, supra
note 17, at 601, and provides "relatively unhampered procedures. to meet changing con-
ditions by effecting changes in the corporate purposes and security structures," Katz, The
Philosophy of Midentfi Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw & CoNTmp. PROB. 177, 179 (1958).
115. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 602(a), 603(a), 1201(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212(a), 215, 223(a), (d) (1974).
116. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(4) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 616(a)(2) (McKinney 1963); ABA-AI MODEL
Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. 2D § 145 (1971).
117. Amending the articles of incorporation commonly requires approval by the board
of directors, an affirmative vote of the shareholders, and an appropriate filing with a desig-
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shark repellent amendments is unassailable." 8
In fact, both traditional fiduciary analysis and technical statutory
construction are unsuitable for resolving the problem posed by shark
repellent amendments. As I have argued elsewhere," 9 the prevailing
measure of fiduciary obligation is virtually without content where
the conflict of interest triggering its application concerns the mainte-
nance of control. Similarly, analysis limited to technical construction
of statutory language is incapable of confronting the issue of manage-
ment's appropriate role in conflicts over corporate control. As
Charles Black has argued concerning an analogous problem, it is not
helpful to get "out dictionaries whose entries will not really respond
to the question we are putting, or scanning utterances, contemporary
with the text, of persons who did not really face the question we are
asking. We will have to deal with policy and not with grammar.' 120
The remainder of this Part demonstrates that a traditional attack
on the validity of shark repellent amendments is likely to be ineffec-
tual and that the statutory defense offered on their behalf is simply
unconvincing. Both points are independently worth making and, in
any event, are a necessary way station on the road to a structural
analysis of shark repellent amendments.
nated state official. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 902, 905 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 241, 242, 245 (1974 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 801, 805
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-1982).
118. See notes 132-43 infra and accompanying text. Unusual forms of amendments,
however, may raise particular issues not so dearly covered by the text of the applicable corpo-
rate statute. E.g., Proxy Statement of Foremost-McKesson, Inc. 30-31 (June 17, 1980) (grant
of power to "Board of Directors to restrict and limit the transfer to, and the purchase, owner-
ship, and voting of shares by, or on behalf of a particular stockholder to the extent and for the
period of time that: (i) the Corporation is directed in writing to do so by a governmental
authority or (ii) to the extent the Board of Directors otherwise deems necessary, based on
written advice received from any such governmental authority, that it takes such action in
order to avoid the suspension, revocation, loss or forfeiture of, or refusal to renew or reissue, a
license, franchise, grant of authority, line of business, right or benefit."); see also Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 506 (D. Del. 1981) (validity of amend-
ment barring alien stock ownership). Seagram is discussed in note 131 infra.
Of the more familiar forms of amendments, the problem of applying the corporate stat-
ute is most acute with right of redemption provisions. For example, there are questions under
some corporate statutes of whether common stock may be made redeemable. In addition,
legal capital-type restrictions may pievent redemption at the time the amendment is trig-
gered. See Mestres & Gerlits, Tender Offrs: Connderationsfor the Defense, in ELEVENTH ANNUAL
INsTruTE ON SEcuamEs REGULATION 49, 75-76 (1980); Smith, supra note 6, at 25.
119. Gilson, supra note 2, at 825-31.




A. The Application of the Fiduciag Pn'nczple in Control Settings
I have previously traced the common law development of the
fairness test-the measure of management's discharge of its duty of
loyalty in conflict of interest settings-and argued that the courts
have cleverly avoided confronting the obvious and unavoidable con-
flict of interest posed by a potential change of control. 12' Typical
defensive tactics undertaken by management facing a challenger for
control include repurchasing the insurgent's shares at a premium
over market price and placing newly issued shares in the hands of an
ally, either of which effectively blocks management's displacement.
In both settings, the fairness test could be applied to the terms of the
transaction. In the repurchase case, inquiry could be made into the
fairness of the price the company pays for its shares, and in the place-
ment case, the fairness of the price the company receives for its shares
could be examined. In both cases, however, such an inquiry com-
pletely misses the point. Management's conflict of interest does not
arise from the price assigned to the company's shares in the transac-
tion, but from having undertaken the transaction at all. "Applying a
fairness standard to this decision, however, requires a court to deter-
mine whether it was 'fair' for control to remain with management
rather than shift to the offeror. And this inquiry must necessarily
focus on whether the shareholders would be better off with existing
management or by selling their shares." 122 Quite appropriately, the
courts have been unwilling to engage in such analysis.123
In both the repurchase and the new issuance settings, the courts
avoided confronting the conflict of interest necessitating the fairness
review by inquiring into management's motives.' 24 If a court could
conclude that management undertook the repurchase because of a
conflict over business policy with the insurgent or because the trans-
action also served a legitimate corporate interest, the conflict of inter-
est was exorcised. The measure of management's performance was
then the business judgment test, in effect a conclusion that the man-
agement action in question would not be reviewed at all.1 25
In short, the courts avoided confronting management's conflict of
interest in actual control contests by focusing on motive: Did man-
agement believe there was a policy conflict or believe that its action
121. Gilson, supra note 2, at 824-31.
122. Id. at 827.
123. Id. at 827-31.
124. Id. at 827-29.
125. Id. at 822.
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served a legitimate corporate purpose? Given that the courts thus
avoided addressing management's real conflict of interest in actual
control contests,12 6 it is hardly likely that they would find a violation
of the duty of loyalty because of the impact on afuture control contest
of management's introduction of defensive charter amendments
whose stated purpose is to protect the shareholders.
B. Textual Anaysis of the Validity of Shark Repellent Amendments
Just as the duty of loyalty provides the traditional focus for an
attack on the validity of shark repellent amendments, a textual anal-
ysis of the language of the corporate statute provides the traditional
focus for their defense. This mode of analysis is straightforward and
familiar: It argues that the language of the statute contemplates the
challenged provision and that further inquiry is therefore
unnecessary.
While this approach to the governing statute is useful in evaluat-
ing other questions of corporate law, 127 it is not helpful when applied
to the process by which control of a corporation is shifted. Technical
analysis is by itself unconvincing. As others have pointed out, lan-
guage of "constitutional" scope, such as in a corporate statute, often
simply cannot bear the burden of resolving the character of a dispute
without the assistance of a broader view.128 This section argues that
despite the apparent precision of the corporate statute, it is not re-
sponsive to the control questions posed by shark repellent amend-
ments. The next Part makes the broader argument that the validity
126. Recent cases have consistently taken this approach. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-83 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634
F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Panter v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). In
light of Treadway and Crouse-Hzds, the more attractive language of Judge Weinfeld in Co-
noco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ('"The [Conoco] Directors
are free to continue by proper legal means to express to the shareholders their objection and
hostility to the Seagram proposal, but they are not free to deny them their right to pass upon
this offer or any other offer for the purchase of their shares.', would seem to be limited to the
particular claim before the court: that Seagram's representations that it was only interested
in a friendly transaction estopped it from later making a hostile offer. See also Walton v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
127. One value of a precisely written and rigidly construed corporate statute is that
those dealing with the corporation have the benefit of a form contract which need be overrid-
den only in the unusual case where a result different from that provided by the statute is
desired. See R. POSNER, supra note 65, at 292-96; R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE COR-
P ORATION 6 (1978). Where there is uncertainty as to a court's likelihood of construing the
language of the statute in light of its plain meaning, those dealing with the corporation will
incur the expense of individually tailored contracts.
128. See C. BLACK, supra note 120, at 22-23; M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 85-86.
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of shark repellent amendments must depend on the overall corporate
structure that derives not only from the statute, but from the rela-
tionships among corporate constituents and between the corporation
and the outside world.
I have found only three cases that directly confront the validity of
shark repellent amendments or their equivalents. Of these, Seibert v.
Gulton Industries, Inc. 129 and Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker 13° pre-
sent useful examples of the technical approach to the claim that
shark repellent amendments are invalid. 131
129. Civ. Action No. 5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979), summarily aj'd, 414 A.2d 822 (Del.
1980).
130. 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
131. The third case, Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 405 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1980), is a
virtual replay of Seibert v. Gulton Industries, Inc., except that the latter raises the issue under
the Delaware General Corporation Law while the former is concerned with the Massachu-
setts Business Corporation Law. The overall importance of Delaware corporate law as well as
the greater familiarity of most lawyers with its provisions is the basis for my choice of Gullon
for consideration in the text.
While these three cases stand alone in their direct consideration of the validity of shark
repellent amendments, other cases have touched on the matter indirectly. In Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Ltd. v. Conoco, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 506 (D. Del. 1981), Seagrams challenged the
validity of amendments to Conoco's bylaws which limited alien ownership by voiding stock
transfer to an alien if that transfer would result in exceeding an applicable "Alien Permitted
Percentage." The court elected not to reach the issue of the reasonability of the amendment,
instead construing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (Supp. 1980), to bar the application of a
transfer restriction to any shares outstanding prior to its adoption that had not voted in favor
of the restriction. This construction had the effect of prohibiting the application of the bylaw
amendment to any outstanding shares, since only the board of directors had approved it, and,
due to difficulties of tracing share ownership, eliminated the value of such an amendment in a
large public corporation even if approved by a majority of the shareholders. See Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978) (striking down an attempt by a successful offeror
who was unable to obtain a supermajority for a second-step transaction to circumvent that
requirement through a subsidiary merger, thereby implying that the supermajority require-
ment was viewed as unobjectionable); see also Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetron Corp.,
299 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1969) (challenge to adequacy of proxy disclosure concerning shark
repellent proposals); McKee & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of San Diego, 265 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal.
1967) (upholding validity of bylaw adopted during contest for control requiring, inter alia,
that nominees for directors have been residents of San Diego County for one year and not be
an attorney or otherwise connected with other banks); Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, Civ. Action No.
5798 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979) (available Mar. 9, 1982, on LEXIS, Del library, Chncry file)
(directors alone cannot authorize class of preferred stock having 80% class vote requirement
on mergers; shareholder vote required).
Although judicial consideration of the validity of shark repellent amendments has-been
sparse, complaints filed which challenge their validity are common. Examples of these are set
out as exhibits in A. FLEISCHER, supira note 2, at 390-23; 2 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 1, at M-1. Like most litigation in the tender offer field, the complaints are largely
strategic, Wachtell, supra note 3, and do not ripen into decisions on the merits.
There have also been some state administrative efforts to discourage shark repellent
amendments. Harold Marsh reports that "it is understood" that the California Secretary of
State would not file a related person supermajority amendment under the pre-1977 California
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In Gulton, the plaintiff challenged the most common type of shark
repellent amendment: a supermajority provision requiring an 80%
shareholder vote for "a merger or consolidation or similar take-
over"1 32 with anyone owning more than 5% of the company's shares
unless the board of directors had approved the transaction before the
acquisition of the 5% interest. 13 3 Although the supermajority re-
quirement had been adopted by a vote of only 54% of the sharehold-
ers, it was protected by a simultaneously adopted lock-up provision
requiring an 80% vote for repeal or amendment. 3 4 The plaintiff's
attack on the supermajority provision focused on the role it assigned
the board of directors. Conceding that the articles of incorporation
could have required a supermajority vote for the covered transac-
tions under all circumstances,1 35 she claimed that the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law did not allow the percentage vote required to
differ depending upon whether the board of directors had approved
the transaction at the required time.
The court's analysis was pristinely technical. Section 102(b) (4) of
the Delaware statute permits a corporation's certificate of incorpora-
tion to require a shareholder vote higher than the usual bare major-
ity provided by the statute for "any corporate action."' 36
Completing the syllogism, the court concluded that Gulton's
supermajority provision did no more than require a different share-
Corporations Code, and believes it likely that this practice will continue under the new Code.
I H. MARSH, CALIFORNIA COPRPORATIONs LAW & PRACTICE § 10.39 (1977). In addition, the
Wisconsin Commission on Securities has adopted regulations under the Wisconsin blue sky
statute which allow prohibition of the sale of an issuer's equity securities if its charter contains
shark repellent amendments. WIs. ADMIN. CODE § SEC 3.07(2) (1970, as amended), reprinted
in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 64,527.
132. Gulon, slip op. at 2.
133. See note 45 .ufira and accompanying text.
134. The Gulton Industries Proxy Statement 8 (May 23, 1977) described the lock-up
provision as follows:
At present, only the vote of a majority of the outstanding shares of the Com-
pany entitled to vote is necessary to authorize corporate transactions requiring
stockholder approval or amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation. Under the
proposed amendment ..., the holders of 21% of the outstanding shares of the
Company would be able to prevent certain transactions or amendments to the Cer-
tificate of Incorporation even if the holders of 79% of the outstanding shares were in
favor of such action.
135. Gulon, slip op. at 3. I am unwilling to make this concession. See notes 142-52 infra
and accompanying text.
136. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1974). Id. § 251 contains the majority re-
quirement for mergers and § 271 for sales of assets. Section 242(a) authorizes amendment of
the certificate of incorporation "in any and as many respects as may be desired, so long as
[the] certificate of incorporation as amended would contain only such provisions as it would
be lawful and proper to insert in an original certificate of incorporation."
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holder vote for a different "corporate action," precisely as authorized
under section 102(b)(4). The percentage approval required was, in
the court's words, "dependent upon the matter subject to the vote,
i.e., a business combination with a 5 per cent shareholder approved
by the board of directors or a combination with a 5 per cent share-
holder opposed by the board." 137 The supermajority amendment
thus was expressly authorized by the language of the statute; finding
no "public policy against the so-called 'shifting numbers' where cor-
porate voting rights are concerned," 138 the court upheld the charter
provision.
Simply as a matter of textual analysis, the court's construction of
the statute is hardly persuasive. The argument reduces to an asser-
tion that the amendment's shifting vote requirement satisfies the lan-
guage of section 102(b)(4) because a merger which the board has not
approved is a different "action" from one which it has approved. Re-
gardless of one's position on the wisdom of such an amendment, the
word "action" as it appears in the statute does not resolve the matter.
A dictionary definition of the word refers to "a thing done";1 39 noth-
ing in the text of the statute forecloses a construction that identifies
the "thing" for which approval is sought as the merger, and rejects
the exercise in subcategorization that distinguishes between types of
mergers based on when approval of the board of directors is ob-
tained.14 But more important, examination of the corporate statute
alone is not responsive to the question posed by shark repellent
amendments-the appropriate allocation of roles between directors
and shareholders in a battle for control. 141
137. Culton, slip op. at 7. In fact, the court's formulation of the alternatives is incorrect.
Under the form of exception contained in the Gulton Industries provision, the determining
factor was not whether the board of directors approved the transaction, since the board must
approve any merger, but whether the board had approved the transaction before or after the
shareholder had acquired 5% of the outstanding stock.
138. Id. at 8-9.
139. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 21 (unabr. 1976).
140. The court's treatment of this issue in Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 405 N.E.2d
131 (Mass. 1980), was similarly linguistic. Responding to plaintiff's argument that the statu-
tory authorization for a supermajority voting requirement did not allow differing votes de-
pending on director approval, the court stated:
This argument is unpersuasive. According to § 8(a), the by-law controls
"whenever" it requires a greater proportion of shareholders to vote for a particular
proposal than the statute specifies. The plaintiff has ignored the word "whenever."
The by-law specifies precisely "when" a 75% shareholder vote rather than the statu-
tory majority will be required. With the words "whenever" and "greater propor-
tion" given their ordinary meaning, ... the by-law fully complies with § 8(a).
Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
141. There is no indication in the court's opinion that it considered the allocation of
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It is necessary, however, to take analysis of the indeterminacy of
the statutory language a step further. Some supermajority amend-
ments do not provide for differing approval percentages based on di-
rector action. 142 With respect to these amendments, the statutory
language is not ambiguous: Section 102(b)(4) expressly authorizes a
greater-than-majority voting requirement. Indeed, the Gulton court
pointed out that the plaintiff conceded "it would be permissible...
to require an 80 per cent vote for approval of [any] merger ....
This would simply be calling for 'the vote of a larger portion of the
stock.' 143 But the statute's apparent clarity is illusory. The history
of statutory provisions that authorize supermajority requirements
demonstrates that it is impossible to resolve the validity of shark re-
pellent amendments without considering the decisionmaking roles of
management and shareholders inherent in the structure of the
corporation.
The origin of statutory provisions authorizing supermajority vot-
ing requirements lies in the recognition that:
the enabling-act type of statute, which became standard by the
1930's, tacitly assumed that the corporation would be one with a
substantial number of shareholders.
The more difficult problems which the standard form of incor-
poration posed for the close-held firm concerned control. A minor-
ity investor in a close-held corporation was peculiarly vulnerable
vis-a-vis the majority. . . . Thus individuals investing in a close-
held firm had reason to write into its organization requirements of
unanimity or specially high requirements for a quorum or a decid-
ing vote on critical matters, along with stipulations against dilution
of their relative voting power. . . . The standard incorporation
acts were not responsive to these interests. 144
The legislative response took the form of statutes like Delaware sec-
authority between management and shareholders reflected in the statute a relevant inquiry.
The only possible reference to this subject comes in the last sentence before the opinion's final
dispositional paragraph: "Moreover, various provisions of the corporation law confer discre-
tion upon a board of directors in connection with mergers and other corporate transactions."
Gulton, slip op. at 9. The existence of managerial discretion in one area, however, may coun-
sel against, rather than favor, similar discretion in a related area. See note 191 infra.
142. In these a supermajority vote is required regardless of the board of directors's ap-
proval and regardless of its composition.
143. Gulton, slip op. at 3.
144. J. HURST, THE LEGITImAcY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 1780-1970, at 76-78 (1970); see, e.g., Hornstein,Judidal Tolerance of the Incorporated
Partnership, 18 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 435, 443 (1953); Manne, Our Two Corporation Syslten:
Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 277 (1967).
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tion 102(b)(4) and its predecessors 145 and section 143 of the Model
Business Corporation Act and its predecessor, 146 which authorized
higher shareholder approval requirements than those specified in the
statute.
While these statutory provisions are not on their face limited to
close corporations, the legislative history is quite clear in pointing to
the relationship between the needs of the close corporation and statu-
tory authorization of supermajority voting requirements. For exam-
ple, the drafting committee responsible for Model Act section 143
expressly states their belief that the "provisions authorized by section
143 are peculiarly for use by a close corporation.1 147 Indeed, the nu-
merous bibliographic references provided by the drafting committee
deal exclusiveoy with problems related to control in the close corpora-
tion. 48 Similarly, leading treatises commenting on the corporation
laws of major commercial states identify the plight of the close corpo-
ration as the motivation for statutory validation of supermajority
provisions. With respect to section 204(a)(5) of the recently adopted
California Corporations Code,1 49 Ballantine and Sterling state:
This. .. reason, the protection of minority shareholders (especially
in a close corporation) from adverse or oppressive actions by other
shareholders, is the principal reason for permitting a corporation to
include a super-majority vote requirement in its articles of
incorporation.5
°
A similar conclusion emerges regarding the New York statute:
BCL § 616 is one of the more important statutes designed to meet
the needs of close corporations. In such corporations, sometimes
referred to as "incorporated partnerships," minority shareholders
145. Del. Laws ch. 65, § 5(11) (Revised Code 1935).
146. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 136 (Supp. 1966). The change in num-
bering from § 136 to § 143 was not accompanied by substantive change.
147. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 143, 2 (comment to § 143) (1971).
148. Id. 1 5.
149. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5) (West Supp. 1981) allows articles of incorporation to
include:
(a) Any or all of the following provisions, which shall not be effective unless ex-
pressly provided in the articles:
(5) A provision requiring, for any or all corporate actions (except as provided
in Section 303, subdivision (c) of Section 708 and Section 1900) the vote of a larger
proportion or of all of the shares of any class or series, or the vote or quorum for
taking action of a larger proportion or of all of the directors, than is otherwise re-
quired by this division.
150. 1 H. BALLENTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAws § 61.03 (4th
ed. 1979); accord, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE
CORPORATIONS CODE 38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SELE=T COMMITTEE REPORT].
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often desire protection against ordinary majority rule. Super-
statutory quorum and vote requirements are one of the most com-
mon means of obtaining such protection, since they provide the
minority with the means by which it can veto majority action.' 5 '
And Professor Folk, the official reporter and adviser to the Delaware
Committee on the Revision of the General Corporation Law, com-
menting with respect to Delaware section 102(b) (4) itself, states that
"it is evident that high vote requirements are chiefly of interest to the
small corporation." 152
My point is not that the statutory text, with or without its legisla-
tive history, makes supermajority provisions available only to close
corporations. 153 It is merely that the text alone cannot justify the
Gulton court's construction authorizing use of shark repellent amend-
ments in public corporations to deter tender offers. An adequate in-
quiry requires consideration of the appropriate roles to be assigned to
management and shareholders in the context of a change in control,
something that the text of pro'visions like section 102(b)(4) simply
does not address.
A second case, Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 5 4 presents a sim-
ilarly technical analysis of a corporate charter provision that, while
not yet a common form of shark repellent amendment, has the poten-
tial to become one. 5 5 In Providence & Worcester, the trustees in bank-
ruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad were the largest stockholder in
Providence & Worcester Company ("P&W"), owning 9,551 shares, or
28%, of the outstanding stock. But P&W's articles of incorporation
contained a sliding scale that limited the voting rights of large hold-
ers to one vote per share for a shareholder's first 50 shares, but only
151. 3 .KANTRowrrz & S. SLuTSKY, WHrrE ON NEw YORK CORPORATIONS § 616.03,
at 6-379 (13th ed. 1981) (footnotes omitted); see Hornstein, Anaysi of Busness Corporation Law,
in N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw app. 1, at 441, 454 (1963) ('The sections which 'accommodate' a
statute primarily designed for public issue corporations to the needs of a close corporation are
the following: Section 616 continues statutory authorization for the super-statutory share-
holders' quorum and vote .... ').
152. E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORTION LAW 8 (1967).
153. The same legislative history that establishes the prominence of close corporation
concerns also seems to contemplate a limited application of the provisions to public corpora-
tions. See SELEr COMMrrrEE REPORT, suipra note 150, at 38 Cm addition to close corpora-
tion use, "a higher percentage requirement may be useful in non-close corporations
particularly where special protection is desired for a certain class of shares'); accord, ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 143, 2 (1971) ("[T]here may be reasons to increase the
statutory percentages in case of publicly held corporations, particularly where special protec-
tion is desired for a particular class of shares."). The question whether such limited use in
public corporations is consistent with a structural approach is considered in note 229 infia.
154. 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
155. See Smith, supra note 6, at. 10-11; Note, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 154, 172 (1978).
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one-twentieth vote per share for additional shares. The articles also
barred any shareholder from voting more than 25% of the outstand-
ing shares, regardless of the number of shares held.5 6 These restric-
tions reduced Penn Central's potential 28% vote to approximately
3%, and triggered a challenge to their validity.157
The validity of the provisions was determined on the field of pris-
tine textual construction. The Court of Chancery began with section
212(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which specifies
that each share receives one vote unless a lawful charter provision
otherwise provides.' The court then examined section 151(a),
which authorizes variation from the one vote per share rule-and
therefore validates charter provisions adopted pursuant to section
212(a)-by allowing a corporation to have "1 or more classes. . . or
. . .series of stock. . . which classes or series may have such voting
powers, full or limited, or no voting powers . . .as shall be stated
and expressed in the certificate of incorporation.' 59 The court con-
cluded that the operative language of section 151(a)--"which classes
or saees may have such voting powers"-allowed different classes and
156. A detailed statement of facts is set forth in the Chancery Court's opinion, 364 A.2d
838, 840-42 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
157. Note, 'upra note 155, at 155 n.8, formulates the mathematics as:
50 votes for the first 50 shares plus 475 votes for the balance (9,501 divided by 20).
This total of 525 is further reduced by the provision that says no one stockholder
may vote more than one-fourth of the outstanding stock. There are 35,000 shares
outstanding, and one-fourth of that number is 8,750. Since the trustees own more
than one-fourth of 35,000, their votes are computed only on 8,750 shares, reducing
their voice to 485 votes (50 plus the dividend of 8,700 divided by 20, or 50 plus 435).
(Citations omitted.)
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1975) provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation and subject to the
provisions of§ 213 of this title, each stockholder shall be entitled to I vote for each
share of capital stock held by such stockholder. If the certificate of incorporation
provides for more or less than 1 vote for any share, on any matter, every reference in
this chapter to a majority or other proportion of stock shall refer to such majority or
other proportion of the votes of such stock.
159. Id. § 151(a) provides:
Every corporation may issue I or more classes of stock or 1 or more series of
stock within any class thereof, any or all of which classes may be of stock with par
value or stock without par value and which classes or series may have such voting
powers, full or limited, or no voting powers, and such designations, preferences and
relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, limita-
tions or restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of
incorporation or of any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions pro-
viding for the issue of such stock adopted by the board of directors pursuant to
authority expressly vested in it by the provisions of its certificate of incorporation.
The power to increase or decrease or otherwise adjust the capital stock as provided
in this chapter shall apply to all or any such classes of stock.
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series of stock to have different voting rights, but did not allow differ-
ent voting rights among shareholders within one class of stock.'
60
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed. The court found that
the language of section 151 did not resolve the issue, 61 and instead
relied on what it viewed as the more explicit language of section
212(a). Noting that the latter section seemed to condition variation
from the one share-one vote standard by cross reference to section
213, which provides for determination of shareholders of record,
162
the court concluded that the absence of a similar cross-reference to
section 15 1(a) demonstrated that the language of that section did not
limit the range of variation authorized by section 212(a).163 The
court finished with an appeal to history, reasoning that since the Del-
aware legislature prior to 1901 had imposed voting restrictions on
specially chartered corporations like those contained in the P&W
charter, "[i]t is reasonable to assume that if there was a legislative
intent to bar such protective voting provisions, it would have been
expressed in § 212(a)."'"
I am not persuaded by this analysis. Indeed, within the limits of
the statutory language, I believe that the Court of Chancery con-
160. 364 A.2d at 847.
161. We cannot agree that the answer to the problem presented is manifest and
explicit on the face of § 151(a). The language of § 151(a), standing alone, neither
permits nor prohibits the type of voting restrictions here challenged, either explicitly
or by necessary implication. The statutory language may be read as Penn Central
and Chancery Court view it; or it may be read as P&W views it. It follows from
such ambiguity that our task is one of statutory construction.
378 A.2d at 122.
162. Section 213 is titled "Fixing date for determination of stockholders of record," and
does no more than specify the date for determining ownership for purposes of voting at a
shareholders' meeting. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (1975).
163. Under § 212(a), voting rights of stockholders may be varied from the "one
share-one vote" standard by the certificate of incorporation, subject only "to the
provisions of § 213" of the Corporation Law. It is significant, we think, that
§ 212(a) was not made expressly subject to the provisions of § 151(a) in a similar
manner. The absence in § 212(a) of such similar cross reference to § 151(a) is, in our
judgment, indicative of the absence of any legislative intent to prohibit, by § 151(a),
charter restrictions upon stockholders' voting rights such as are under challenge
here.
378 A.2d at 123 (citations omitted). The court's argument with respect to the presence or
absence of a cross-reference in § 212(a) is, frankly, silly. The obvious purpose of the cross-
reference to § 213 is to make it clear that the shareholders entitled to "one vote for each
share" under § 212(a) are those shareholders who own the shares on the record date fixed
pursuant to § 213. It is hardly likely that the absence of a cross-reference to any other section
establishes the irrelevance of the rest of the statute for construction of other portions of
§ 212(a).
164. Id. at 124.
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struction clearly has the better of it. But no matter what one thinks
about the comparative ambiguity of sections 151 (a) and 212(a), it is
undeniable that the supreme court never confronted or even ac-
knowledged the central inquiry necessary to resolve the validity of
the P&W voting structure: What was the provision-which the court
expressly referred to as "protective" 6 -designed to protect?
As the Delaware Supreme Court recognized, voting restrictions
like the one in the P&W articles were common among nineteenth-
century corporations. At that time general incorporation statutes,
available to all who satisfied essentially formal requirements, were
not widespread; incorporation largely remained an act of the sover-
eign requiring a special charter granted by the legislature. 166 The
principal beneficiaries of legislative charters were special action
franchises--often in the character of public utilities. 167 Public con-
cern over the concentration of power in such special action
franchises, although balanced by recognition of the economic utility
of the corporate form, led to restrictions on legislatively chartered
corporations, including the kind of voting restriction in the P&W ar-
ticles.' 68 In the nineteenth-century view, if economic power was to
be centered in the corporation, it was necessary to prevent individu-
als from exploiting that centralization through ownership of a major-
ity of a corporation's shares. 169 This was particularly the case with
transportation companies such as P&W, originally a railroad. As the
Court of Chancery noted, the restrictive voting scheme at issue was
imposed in the original legislative charter granted by the legislatures
165. Id.
166. The development of the incorporation process, from special charters to general
incorporation statutes, is traced in, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 127-38 (1932); R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORA-
TiON 22-33 (1979); J. HURST, supra note 144, at 13-111.
167. J. HURST, supra note 144, at 17, reports that of the 317 legislative charters granted
in the United States between 1780 and 1801, two-thirds were for transportation companies,
20% for banks and insurance companies, 10% for water and other local service companies,
and only 4% for miscellaneous purposes. Of the 2,333 corporations chartered by the Penn-
sylvania legislature between 1790 and 1860, 64% were for transportation companies, 18% for
financial companies, and 6% for local utilities.
168. 2J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 3-33
(1917); E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 195-201, 245, 250,
259-60, 328 (1954); J. HURST, supra note 144, at 44-164.
169. J. DAVIS, sufira note 168; E. DODD, supra note 168; Ratner, The Goverment ofBusiness
Corforatiots. Criical Re/ectione on the Rule of One Share, One Vote, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 46
n.168 (1970) (restrictions of the type contained in P&W charter "were more prevalent in the
general and specific laws relating to 'quasi-public' corporations, such as banks and transpor-
tation companies than they were in the laws relating to manufacturing companies").
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of Rhode Island and Massachusetts in 1844.170 Indeed, in 1836, the
Massachusetts legislature had adopted legislation requiring provi-
sions of this sort in all subsequent railroad charters for the precise
purpose of limiting "[c]oncentration of control."' 71
In short, the provisions that the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
as a means of enshrining a concentration of control in management
were originally intended to prevent any concentration of control.
They reflected a concern not for the well-being of minority share-
holders, but for the community the corporation served. Neither the
text of the Delaware statute nor its "legislative history" is directed at
the allocation of responsibility between management and sharehold-
ers. The court's validation of the P&W provision without consider-
ing that question is simply an exercise in formalism.
The lesson of Gulton Industries and Providence & Worcester is
straightforward: The language of a typical corporate statute does
not, in itself, provide a complete description of how the corporate
entity functions. The public corporation is an artificial "person," an
intricate composite of the interaction both between its constituents-
among whom are shareholders and management-and between the
corporation and the competitive environment in which it func-
tions. 72 The corporate statute does no more than create the entity's
skeleton. Resolution of the appropriate allocation of responsibility
between management and shareholders with respect to changes in
corporate control requires an understanding of the variety of rela-
tionships that envelop the statutory skeleton.
III. A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO THE VALIDITY OF SHARK
REPELLENT AMENDMENTS
I have previously described the structure of the modern public
corporation, including statutory and market aspects, with particular
emphasis on the allocation of authority between management and
shareholders. 73 I argued that we should evaluate the validity of
postoffer defensive tactics by reference to that structure and to the
relationship between management and shareholders that it dic-
170. 364 A.2d at 841.
171. E. DODD, sufira note 168, at 327-28.
172. For an attempt to describe the manner in which the corporation interacts with and
responds to its environment by means of a formal feedback model, see Williamson, Corporate
Control and the Thoaq of the Fim, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPO-
RATE SECURITIES 281-336 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
173. Gilson, sufi'a note 2, at 833-40.
[Vol. 34:775
SHARK REPELLENT AMENDMENTS
tates. 17 4 That structure is equally relevant to the validity of preoffer
shark repellent amendments, since these explicitly alter even the for-
mal relationship between management and shareholders regarding
changes of control. Thus, their consistency with the corporate struc-
ture should determine their validity; the outline of that structure
bears restatement.
At the core of the structure of the modem public corporation are
the benefits and costs resulting from the separation of ownership and
management. Benefits from specialization, and from elimination of
the transaction costs inherent in management by a multitude of
shareholders, make this separation desirable; 175 managerial discretion
to favor itself, unavoidably resulting from this separation, accounts
for the costs. 176 The remainder of the corporate structure, consisting
of market, judicial, and statutory elements, forms a coherent pattern
that operates to minimize management incentives to exploit its dis-
cretion for its own benefit at the expense of the shareholders. The
specter of business failure threatens both the shareholders' invest-
ment and managers' jobs, thereby constraining managerial discretion
to operate inefficiently.17 7 Similarly, poor market performance by
the corporation reflects badly on the skills of its managers, reducing
the value of the managers' human capital in the employment market
just as it reduces the value of the shareholders' investment in the cap-
ital market.1 78  Market constraints thus cause management and
shareholder concerns for efficiency to parallel one another closely, de-
spite the separation of ownership and management. As a result,
there is little need for ex post judicial review of management effi-
ciency-a conclusion consistent with the substance, if not the rheto-
ric, of judicial development of the duty of care and the business
judgment rule. 17 9
In contrast, similarly effective market constraints do not limit
174. Id. at 845-48.
175. Id. at 834; see, e.g., Anderson, ConA'cts ofInterest: Efiiency, Faimess and Corporate Struc-
ture, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 738, 778-79 (1978); Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 776, 779 (1979); Heynann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules,
86 HARV. L. R v. 797, 831-33 (1973).
176. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 835-36; see also Alchian & Demsetz, Productin, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EOON. RE V. 777 (1972); Fama, sura note 74, at 296;
Jensen & Meckling, sura note 65, at 308-10.
177. Gilson, supra note 2, at 837-38; see, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 65, at 302; R. WIN-
TER, supra note 127, at 18.
178. Gilson, supra note 2, at 837-38; see Fama, sura note 74; see also R. POSNER, .supra
note 65, at 302; Werner, supra note 74, at 389.
179. Gilson, supra note 2, at 822-24.
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management's discretion to self-deal-to allocate to itself too much
of the corporate income stream-in an efientdy operating corpora-
tion. Here, I argued, the legal system compensates for this failure by
imposing a substantive constraint-the duty of loyalty, whose dis-
charge is measured by the traditional fairness test. 180
The fairness test's value is that it provides a largely objective and
predictable constraint on management's ability to favor itself in cor-
porate transactions. Management will be held to terms which would
be commercially reasonable in an arm's-length transaction and
which can be determined, albeit inexactly, by recourse to compara-
ble market transactions and appraisals. Where the method by which
management favors itself is more subtle and therefore lacks a ready
market reference--e.g., a decision to use funds for acquisitions rather
than dividend payments because of a managerial desire for the stat-
ure associated with running a larger corporation-a "fairness" stan-
dard provides little guidance for judicial review. Another market-
the market for corporate control-constrains these more subtle exer-
cises of managerial discretion to self-deal, thus filling the gap left by
the unavoidable shortcomings of the corporate structure's legal com-
ponent. 18' The reduced value of the corporation's stock reflects man-
agement deviation from practices maximizing shareholder wealth.
When a potential offeror determines that the corporation is worth
more to it after displacing nonmaximizing management 18 2 than the
price (including transaction costs) of obtaining control, management
will be displaced. More important, the very threat of displacement
operates as a constant check on managerial behavior. 8 3
For that threat to have substance, however, there must be an ef-
fective mechanism by which incumbent management may be dis-
placed. It is in this context that the tender offers and shark repellent
amendments take on their critical role in the corporate structure. Of
the four means to secure control of a public corporation, two-
merger and sale of assets-require the approval of the target board of
directors and, therefore, do not present a realistic threat of forcible
180. Id. at 839-40.
181. Id. at 841-45.
182. I include within the term "nonmaximizing management" those who manage cor-
porations which lack the financial or other opportunities necessary to achieve efficient opera-
tion, as well as those whose failings reflect their own lack of skill. This distinction is intended
to allow for both acquisitions based on expectations of synergy and those based on eliminat-
ing incompetency. See id. at 853 n. 119, 872-74.




displacement. 8 4 Because of the advantages inherent in incumbency,
a third means, the proxy contest, is an unattractive, although not
entirely unavailable, mechanism. 85 The tender offer, made directly
to shareholders without the need for management cooperation,
stands out as by far the best available mechanism to effectuate the
market for corporate control. 8 6 But for a tender offer to serve this
end there must be direct access to target shareholders without man-
agement interference. 87 It is in this context that a structural ap-
proach considers the validity of shark repellent amendments.
The intended result of a carefully crafted group of shark repellent
amendments is to make a tender offer impossible without manage-
ment consent. 88 Recall, for example, that the supermajority vote
requirement in Gulton Industries applied to any transaction with a 5%
shareholder unless incumbent management had consented to the
transaction before the shareholder had acquired its position. 8 9 At the
same time, common exceptions in shark repellent amendments sus-
pend their operation if incumbent management approves the trans-
action.' 90 The effort is to limit access to shareholders through a
tender offer just as the corporate statute limits access to shareholders
with respect to a merger or sale of assets: A tender offer is intended
to be impossible without the incumbent management's approval.
This result is equally inconsistent with the structure of the mod-
ern public corporation whether it occurs before a tender offer,
through shark repellent amendments, or afterwards through other
defensive tactics. Shark repellent amendments that give manage-
ment the same ability to block tender offers as the corporate statute
gives with respect to mergers and sales of assets result in manage-
ment's effective monopoly on corporate control. The threat of dis-
placement will then provide little constraint on management
behavior. Management will relinquish control only when the bene-
fits to it from the proposed transaction exceed the value of its retain-
ing discretion. Shark repellent amendments eliminate an essential
means by which the corporate structure-ideally a coherent frame-
184. Gilson, supra note 2, at 843.
185. Id.
186. ' The market for corporate control is crucial to the corporate structure because
neither other markets nor a fiduciary 'fairness' standard effectively constrains some forms of
management self-dealing .... In turn, the tender offer is crucial because no other displace-
ment mechanism is available without management cooperation." Id. at 845-46.
187. Id. at 875-81.
188. See text accompanying notes 18-63 supra.
189. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
A pril 1982]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
work of statutory, judical, and market components-constrains man-
agerial discretion. They are therefore invalid. 9'
Against this backdrop, the argument proffered by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Gulton Industries-that the inclusion of authority
for a supermajority vote in a statutory laundry list of permissible
charter provisions 92 legitimizes shark repellent amendments-is sim-
ply untenable. The allocation of responsibility between management
and shareholders with respect to changes of control, both in the stat-
ute itself and through market constraints, is too critical to the corpo-
rate structure to allow fundamental alteration by so facile an
analysis.
While the argument establishing the invalidity of shark repellent
amendments is now clear, two problems remain. First, why should
we prohibit provisions that have been approved by a majority of the
shareholders? After all, if the shareholders did not prefer the new
role assigned to management, they could have voted against it. Sec-
ond, as a practical matter, how do we identify the types of amend-
ments the structural argument has rendered invalid?
IV. THE NAGGING QUESTION: WHY Do
SHAREHOLDERS APPROVE?
I have argued that shark repellent amendments are inconsistent
with the corporate structure established by typical corporation stat-
utes, associated legal rules, and the markets in which the corporation
and its constituents participate. One must wonder, however, why the
issue arises at all. The structure of the corporation has as its central
logic the control of management's discretion to benefit itself at the
191. I have previously demonstrated that management control over mergers and sales of
assets, as is provided by the typical corporate statute, not only is consistent with unlimited
shareholder access to tender offers but, indeed, requires it. Because corporate acquisitions are
complicated transactions requiring substantial skills to negotiate, rational shareholders would
prefer that management approve a transaction before they devote their time to the proposal.
This, of course, is precisely the procedure that the typical corporate statute prescribes for
mergers and sales of assets. Ste, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1001 (sale of assets), 1101 (merger)
(West 1977 & Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets) (1975
& Supp. 1980); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acrr ANN. 2D §§ 71 (merger), 79 (sale of assets)
(1971). The problem, however, is keeping management from abusing this discretion by, for
example, rejecting an offer favorable to the shareholders, out of the desire to remain in con-
trol. The tender offer provides this necessary check. If management abuses its discretion by
recalcitrant negotiation, then the offeror may bypass management and go directly to the
shareholders by means of a tender offer. Consistent with this conclusion, the typical corpo-
rate statute gives management no explicit role in tender offers. See Gilson, .fufra note 2, at
845-52.
192. Se text accompanying notes 136-38 supra.
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expense of shareholders. The injury to shareholders resulting from
the use of shark repellent amendments to circumvent the constraints
imposed by the corporate structure seems direct and immediate:
Shareholders are prevented from selling their shares at a price
higher, and often much higher, than they could otherwise obtain in
the market."' If the adoption of shark repellent amendments causes
the market to lower its estimate of the value of the corporation's stock
because of the resulting increase in management's discretion to self-
deal, it will be precisely those shareholders voting for adoption who
bear the cost.'9 But since shareholders' interests are directly impli-
cated, why need we be concerned with shark repellent amendments
at all? Management cannot impose these amendments on sharehold-
ers; the shareholders must approve them by a majority vote. Why
not simply rely upon their self-interest to protect their own and soci-
ety's interest without regulatory intervention? Is there any reason to
believe that shareholder voting does not adequately protect share-
holder interest in access to the best price, and protect society's inter-
est in an efficient allocation of resources?
One answer might be that shareholders are irrational, that by
voting to adopt shark repellent amendments, they consciously choose
a course that is less favorable than the available alternatives. But
this explanation is inconsistent with the central premise of modern
financial theory-that shareholders invest in securities to increase
their wealth-and its corollary that a greater return is preferable to a
lesser return, given equivalent risk. 95 While one may point to cir-
cumstances where shareholders may seem to reduce their wealth by
rejecting a higher price, the apparent irrationality of this behavior
more likely reflects an overly narrow concept of wealth on the part of
the observer rather than shareholder failure to maximize. For exam-
ple, consider a shareholder who operates a tavern across from the
manufacturing facility of a target corporation. If the offeror would
close the facility if the offer is successful, the shareholder's overall
wealth may be increased by forgoing the offered premium because of
the effect of the offer's success on the value of the shareholder's other
193. While recent measurements of the size of tender offer premiums vary, the size of
the premium is uniformly quite substantial. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 94, at 345-46, 348
(average premium of 49%); Chatlos, The SEC vs. investors on te offers, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 6, 7 (72% for unfriendly offers).
194. See note 65 supra.
195. See, e.g., W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPrrAL MARKETS 20-33 (1970);






While shareholders are not irrational, they may be ignorant. Pas-
sive investors may not understand the consequences of the shark re-
pellent proposal. In that case, shareholder "apathy"-as evidenced
by voting with management even though an informed analysis would
recommend the opposite course-is understandable. Shareholder
participation in an election reflects a calculus only part of which re-
lates to the particular matter that is the subject of the vote. The goal
of the rational shareholder is to minimize the total of-offsetting costs.
On the one hand, serious participation in corporate voting requires
the shareholder to invest the time and attention necessary to review
and understand the proxy materials. If the proxy statement informa-
tion is inadequate, 97 the shareholders must incur additional costs to
obtain the information necessary to an informed decision. On the
other hand, there are the costs of nonparticipation-the costs to the
shareholder if a proposal is adopted which is not in the shareholder's
interest. 198
The problem may be illuminated by a simple example. Suppose
shareholders are asked to ratify the selection of the corporation's
outside auditor.'9 9 Against the costs of making a meaningful evalua-
tion of management's selection, the shareholders must balance the
costs that they might have to bear if, because of lack of interest, man-
agement gets its way: What damage could be done if management
were given discretion to choose the auditor?
Put in this fashion, a shareholder might rationally conclude to
vote with management and not even read the proxy disclosure con-
196. For a description of the "hometown vote" phenomenon, see Buford, Amend'ng the
Corporate Charter, 32 Bus. LAw. 1353, 1355 (1977). A tender offer can have "consumption" as
well as capital gains effects. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On Value Maximization and Alternative
ObJctives of the Fin, 32 J. FIN. 389 (1977). The point can be generalized. Where corporate
decisions have an impact on shareholders' utility in ways other than through the value of
their stock, profit maximization by the corporate entity may not be the most desirable pro-
duction set for them. See Hirschleifer & Riley, The Analylics of Uncerlainty and Informatin-An
Expositlo Surv, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 1375, 1393-94 (1979). For the relevance of this point to
construction of the corporate statute, see text accompanying notes 220-29 infa.
197. See note 7 supra.
198. See generaly J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 43-62
(1965); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 265-76 (1957). In a corporate
context, see, e.g., Clark, supra note 175; Fischel, supra note 9, at 30-31.
199. While there is no legal requirement that management seek shareholder approval of
the selection of an independent accountant, M. EISENBERG, supra note 46, at 196-98, 205-09,
approval is nonetheless increasingly sought. Hawes, Stockhoder Appointment of Indpendent Audi-
tors.: A Proposal, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 21 (1974). For the disclosure required in this setting,
see item 8 of Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1981).
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cerning the selection of an auditor. The cost of determining which of
the prominent accounting firms is the "best" for the corporation is a
time-consuming process that management has presumably already
completed. Further, management has an interest in the accuracy,
and professionalism of the auditors consistent with the interests of the
shareholders-for example, relations with creditors and the capital
market depend in part on a belief in the integrity of the corporation's
financial statements.2° Moreover, the auditors themselves, whose
professional success depends on a continued reputation for indepen-
dence, have an interest in making sure that the audit process is effec-
tive.2 °1 In sum, the real costs of participation are likely to outweigh
the potential costs of allowing management its choice of auditor
without further examination.
Speculating on the character of a rational shareholder's analysis
of proposed shark repellent amendments is more complicated. A so-
phisticated shareholder may recognize that, because it relates to cor-
porate control, management's proposal may be based on interests
that diverge from his own. Thus, there will be little cost to conclud-
ing that the proposal warrants more careful consideration. However,
because other shareholders may be less sophisticated, the cost of in-
forming them of this conflict must also be considered. That is, one
must add the cost of a proxy fight to educate others, which probably
will be borne entirely by the individual shareholder,0 2 to the cost of
educating oneself if a serious challenge to management is to be
mounted. Thus, sophisticated institutional investors, who likely in-
cur no information costs in concluding that shark repellent amend-
ments are not in their interests, may nonetheless decide not to mount
a serious challenge to management on the matter.
Such a conclusion would, of course, require balancing of the po-
tential costs to shareholders that would result if the shark repellent
amendments were approved. The elements which would enter into
that decision are the probability that a tender offer would be made,
200. See, e.g., Beaver, The Nature of Mandaled Dlkrure, in HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N 618,
637-39 (Comm. Print 1977).
201. See, e.g., Benston, The Maret for Public Accounting &roces: Demand, Supply and Regula-
tion, 2 Acar. J. 2 (1979); Ng, Suppy and Demandfor Auditing Services and the Nature of Regulations
in Auditing, in "THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT" IN PERSPECTrIVE 99 (S. Davidson ed.
1978); R. Watts &J. Zimmerman, The Markets for Independence and Independent Auditors
(Graduate School of Management Working Paper, University of Rochester) (July 1980).
202. See Clark, supra note 175, at 781-82; Easterbrook & Fischel, .supra note 13, at 1181;
Gilson, supra note 2, at 843.
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whether management really would use the amendments to perpetu-
ate its control, and, perhaps most important, whether the shark re-
pellent amendments really would have a significant deterrent effect.
If, ex ante, the probability of an offer is low, or management appears
to be unwilling to fight, or the amendments are not likely to be very
effective, then management's action may not be worth challenging
even if the costs of challenge are low.
Interestingly, the observed behavior of institutional investors-
probably the best surrogate for the "rational investor"-appears to
be roughly consistent with this analysis, if one assumes that shark
repellent amendments are not very effective. Since institutional in-
vestors need not incur significant information costs to conclude that
shark repellent amendments do not serve their interests, one would
expect that such investors would at least vote against these amend-
ments. The available data are in accord with this prediction. The
Securities and Exchange Commission's 1971 Institutional Investor
Study reported that of all voting subjects, shark repellent amend-
ments generated the second greatest incidence of antimanagement
voting by institutional investors.20 3 The increase in the incidence of
the shark repellent phenomenon, and the publicity associated with it
in recent years, should have increased the likelihood of institutional
investors casting negative votes on these amendments, a prediction
confirmed by a survey of the voting behavior of 92 institutional in-
vestors during the 1980 and 1981 proxy seasons. 2° Of the 31 banks
surveyed (including 12 of the 20 largest commercial banks), 19 voted
against supermajority requirements for second-step mergers as a mat-
ter of policy and the others specifically reviewed each such propo-
sal.20 5 At the same time, I am aware of no instance in which an
203. 5 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY,
H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 2754 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY].
204. J. HEARD, VOTING POLICIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES (1981) (survey by Investor Responsibility Research Center).
205. Id at 14-16. The accuracy of the survey is confirmed by a prominent practi-
tioner's recent statement that "[p]olicies in most of the major banks and most of the major
funds call for automatic rejection of" shark repellent amendments. Mestres & Gerlits, Tender
Ofers: Considerationsfor the Defense, in ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 74 (1980) (comment ofJoseph Flom). The survey did show substantial differences in
voting patterns among different categories of institutional investors. While the voting of in-
surance companies and investment firms (including 7 of the 10 largest life insurance compa-
nies) was similar to that ofbanks (10 of 16 routinely opposed supermajority amendments), the
28 colleges and universities surveyed voted against management in large measure only on
social policy resolutions. Four of the six public employee pension funds also routinely voted
with management on such issues. J. HEARD, sufira note 204, at 26-28, 31-34, 38-40.
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institutional investor went beyond simply voting against a shark re-
pellent proposal and initiated a proxy fight. This result is consistent
with a calculus calling for a negative vote, because information costs
need not be incurred to reach that conclusion, while counseling
against a proxy fight, because the limited damage anticipated from
the adoption of the shark repellent amendments does not warrant its
more substantial cost.206
The upshot is that shareholder voting cannot be relied upon to
police management self-interest with respect to the adoption of shark
repellent amendments. The conclusion that shark repellent amend-
ments are invalid is not affected by shareholder votes that approve
them.
V. IDENTIFYING THE INVALID PROVISIONS
The conclusion that shark repellent amendments are invalid does
not end our inquiry. To invalidate shark repellent amendments, we
must first be able to identify them. To be sure, some varieties of
shark repellent amendments-those creating barriers to second-step
206. To be sure, institutional investors appear to have voted in favor of shark repellent
amendments for a substantial period of time when, it seems, they should have known better.
As of 1971 institutional investors had voted in favor of most shark repellent amendments,
INSITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, nutra note 203, at 2754-55; it was a full 10 years before
Mr. Flom could state that policies of "automatic rejection" had been adopted, and even then
disparities existed among institutional investors, see note 205 sufra. The explanation for the
lengthy period necessary to assimilate the notion that one should not always vote with man-
agement, it seems to me, is likely to be anthropological, rather than economic, in the sense of
being based on an examination of the mechanisms by which widely held group norms--in
our case those of the investment community--are changed. While one can describe the pro-
cess in economic terms---i.e., change came slowly because anyone opposing management
would appear to be a troublemaker, would run the risk of sanction within the community,
and thus would because of self-interest move cautiously-the description does no more than
restate the problem: Why did attitudes take so long to change; how did the change occur?
Cf. Kelman, Choice and Udiiy, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 769, 784 ("Once the neo-classicists begin to
introduce 'psychic costs' to preserve their tautology, the choice model breaks down alto-
gether.'. Other examples of this quandary are also present in the tender offer arena. Why
did it take so long for the major investment banking firms to be willing to participate in
hostile takeovers? Not until 1975 did Morgan Stanley, the most conservative investment
banker of all, first participate in such a transaction. M. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, $Upra note
32, at 217-30. Why does Goldman Sachs reportedly still refuse to represent an offeror making
a hostile bid? 7The Making ofthe Megamerger, FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1981, at 58, 60.
One can, however, imagine strategies that counsel in favor of promanagement voting on
shark repellent amendments i it is believed that the amendments are not likely to be effec-
tive. Management provides a source of valuable information to institutional investors which
is not accessible to others, and its availability depends on a good relationship with manage-
ment. If the promanagement vote is costless, then nothing is lost by currying management
favor by a sympathetic vote.
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transactions and those compelling a "fair" price or compulsory re-
demption-are sufficiently self-identifying that no further inquiry is
necessary. But some forms of amendment, principally those designed
to impede transfer of control of the board of directors, can fulfill a
legitimate purpose distinct from their role in deterring a tender of-
fer.2 7 Of course, when potentially dual-purpose amendments are
proposed following the making of a tender offer, the timing of the
proposal itself serves as an identification mechanism.20 ' But shark
repellent amendments are principally designed to deter an offer, not
to respond to one already made.20 9 Thus, they are most often pro-
posed before an offer is even on the horizon. In the absence of an
existing offer which would serve to brand an illegitimate proposal, we
need an identification mechanism that will not degenerate into the
quagmire of intent analysis.
A workable solution to the identification problem for dual-pur-
pose amendments grows out of the fact that shark repellent amend-
ments are ineffective without a lock-up provision requiring a
supermajority vote for amendment or repeal. Such a provision, com-
bined with a simple majority requirement for initial adoption, allows
a present majority to bind a future majority; in the case of a 90%
supermajority amendment, a present 51% can bind a future 89%. It
is this ability to bind a future offeror's majority that gives the shark
repellent concept its promise of deterrence. A simple way to separate
legitimate from illegitimate dual-purpose amendments, then, is to fo-
cus directly on the lock-up provision. As long as a future acquirer of
control does not have a more difficult task with respect to repeal or
amendment than did management with respect to adoption, the
amendment no longer has the potential to deter an offeror, and thus,
207. For example, cumulative voting can be an important means of securing minority
board representation; classified boards are sometimes thought to provide continuity of man-
agement. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CORPORATIONS 258-61
(5th ed. 1980) (collecting arguments and authorities).
208. They would then fall within the prohibition of post offer defensive tactics. See
Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79.
209. There are examples of their adoption in the postoffer period. B.F. Goodrich re-
sorted to their use against Northwest Industries in 1969 in one of the first major defensive
efforts. 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 100-02 (1970).
Much more recently, PSA proposed a package of shark repellent amendments, see notes 28-29
supra, following the accumulation of a significant block of stock by Harold Simmons. Al-
though Simmons had not then announced a tender offer, the amendments were clearly di-
rected at him and he waged an intensive proxy campaign against their adoption. They were
approved by a very narrow margin, after which Simmons was bought out by the company.
PS A Passage of Porcupine Amendmentr Is Citedfor Vathi's Moves to Sell Holding, Wall St. J., Feb. 23,
1979, at 14, col. 2.
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should not be invalid under a structural approach. This neutraliza-
tion can be accomplished by the simple requirement that sharehold-
ers approve amendments imposing a supermajority vote by a vote
equal to or greater than that necessary for action under the amend-
ment. Thus, for example, adoption of a 90% supermajority require-
ment for further amendment of a provision in the corporate charter
would take a 90% vote of the shareholders. 1
The adequacy of this identification mechanism-ignoring the
substance of a dual-purpose amendment in favor of an effort to
render the associated lock-up provision ineffective-turns on the re-
sults of two inquiries. First, does such a symmetrical vote require-
ment in fact eliminate any deterrent to an offeror as a result of the
adoption of the substantive provision; and second, can the nontake-
over goal of the amendment be accomplished without the ability to
bind a future majority?
With regard to the first inquiry, the proposed identification
mechanism is adequate but not perfect: Incumbent management re-
tains something of an advantage, but not a very important one. To
the extent that shareholders' voting calculus at the time of the shark
repellent proposal favors going along with management, a subse-
quent offeror may be disadvantaged by having to face a
supermajority requirement swollen by "rational apathy. '21 ' But the
problem is now of much less significance. Because the supermajority
required can be no higher than the percentage of shareholders that
originally approved it, those not returning their proxies at the time of
approval no longer count as having been on management's side. Pas-
sive resistance therefore becomes effective, 21 2 making it much less
likely that management can secure enough votes to support a lock-up
percentage high enough for management alone to block future repeal
210. This approach is consistent with that of the Michigan statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 450.1455 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(455) (Callaghan 1974)), and similar to that of N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 616(b) (McKinney 1963), although the latter requires only a flat two-
thirds approval regardless of the level of supermajority proposed. An amendment following
the Michigan approach was recently proposed for the Model Business Corporation Act.
Changes In The ModelBasness Corporation Act-Amendment Respecting Increaser In toportion Of Vote
For Shareholder Approval, 36 Bus. LAw. 1899 (1981) (report of Comm. on Corp. Laws).
211. See A. DOWNS, supra note 198, at 265 (coining term "rational abstention"); text
accompanying notes 193-206 supra.
212. There have been examples of extensive passive resistance in connection with shark
repellent amendments. For example, a package of amendments proposed by McCulloch Oil
Corp. failed to secure the necessary 50% approval even though 94% of the proxies that were
returned favored the proposal. MeCulloch Oil Fails To GCet Enough Votes For Antitakeover Plan,
Wall St. J., June 19, 1980, at 30, col. 3.
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or amendment. 213 Moreover, when the lock-up amendment is ap-
plied, the shareholders' voting calculus would tend to favor the of-
feror. For example, voting with a successful offeror to facilitate a
second-step merger by allowing a change in board membership not
only provides shareholders a way out of a minority position but, be-
cause the offeror bears the expense of the proxy process, does so with-
out some of the participation costs which counseled against fighting
management when the shark repellent amendments were proposed.
In sum, little potential for deterrence remains and the proposed iden-
tification mechanism satisfies the first concern raised.
The second inquiry-whether the nontakeover value of dual-pur-
pose amendments is reduced by the elimination of the present major-
ity's ability to bind a future majority-also recommends the
proposed identification mechanism. A rational individual's prefer-
ence in setting the percentage approval required for group action
turns on the balance between two types of costs.2 14 On the one hand,
the individual must consider the costs that may be imposed on him
by future group decisions he disagrees with-which decrease as the
percentage required for approval approaches unanimity.215 On the
other hand, the individual must also take into account the transac-
tion costs associated with making any group decision at all-which
increase not only as the number of people in the group increases, but
also as the percentage required for approval increases. 16 Viewed in
this way, an individual has no reason to favor a decision rule that
makes future decisions more difficult than choosing the decision rule
itself unless the individual can predict future group action that will be
more injurious to him than to other members of the group. In that
event, a decision rule making future decisions more difficult-i.e., in-
creasing the percentage vote for action to be taken with respect to
213. This distinction may be illustrated by an example. Assume that management itself
controls 15% of a potential target's outstanding stock, and wishes to adopt shark repellent
amendments that would require an 85% vote to amend or repeal. If a simple majority of the
outstanding shares is required to adopt the supermajority requirement, and if all shares con-
trolled by management are voted in favor of the amendment, management must secure the
vote of only approximately 42% of the remaining shares in order to succeed. Alternatively, if
an 85% vote were required to adopt the proposed amendment, management would need the
votes of approximately 82% of the remaining shares. Indeed, if one imagines a proposal that
establishes a supermajority requirement equal to the percentage of the outstanding shares
voted in favor of it, an abstention reduces the maximum percentage possible as much as a
vote against the proposal.
214. See generallo J. BucHANAN & G. TULLOCK, sufira note 198, at 63-80.
215. Obviously, if each member of a group could veto any group decision, no action
could be taken that was contrary to any member's interst. Id. at 64.
216. Id. at 68-69.
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them-may be desirable. 17 Applying this analysis in a corporate
context, so long as a shareholder can assume that his future interests
will be best served by that course of conduct which maximizes the
collective wealth of shareholders, 1 one shareholder's interests will
not differ predictably from those of other shareholders, and decisions
made by future shareholders present no greater danger than the
choice of the decision rule itself. But when a shareholder can antici-
pate future decisions that affect him differently than other sharehold-
ers-as management can predict that its interests will differ from
those of shareholders in the event of a takeover attempt-then a rule
that binds a future majority will be desirable.21 9 This form of moti-
vation, however, is precisely that which a structural approach identi-
fies as invalid. In short, the inability to bind a future majority should
not reduce the utility of supermajority requirements except for shark
repellent purposes, exactly the result desired from an identification
mechanism.
VI. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ENABLING CONCEPT
Both the problem of statutory interpretation posed by shark re-
pellent amendments and the structural approach that I have offered
to resolve it can be generalized. The corporate statutes of major
commercial jurisdictions are commonly described as "enabling" in
character;22° regulation of the relationships between corporate con-
stituents intended to eliminate undesirable arrangements is forgone
in favor of maximizing the freedom "to put the arrangements for the
allocation of risk, control, profit, and residual ownership on a free
contract basis.1 221 The general problem of statutory interpretation
in this area is how literally to take that philosophy and, in turn, the
language of the statute: Are there limits that should be imposed on
217. Id. at 78-79.
218. The basis for this assumption is discussed in the text accompanying notes 223-24
inra.
219. Technically, an additional condition must be met: The benefits from applying
such a rule in these predictable future settings must outweigh the extra costs of the rule's
application in all other decisions. Because it will be the shareholders who ultimately bear the
extra transaction costs of inefficient decisionmaking rules, see note 65 supra, this condition
should be satisfied for management with respect to shark repellent amendments.
220. See, e.g., Katz, s.upra note 114, at 179; Latty, supra note 17, at 601-02. The Califor-
nia Corporations Code is an exception. See R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS xv (5th ed. 1979).
221. Latty, supra note 17, at 601. At the other extreme is what has been termed the
"paternal responsibility" approach, which seeks to identify and prohibit particular allocations
of risk, control, and profit thought "to jeopardize responsible investment and management."
Katz, supra note 114, at 180.
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the statute's apparently unrestricted invitation to private ordering?
Broadly speaking, the courts have answered that question in funda-
mentally conflicting ways.
I have argued that the judicial response to shark repellent amend-
ments has been an exercise in statutory literalism. Courts have read
the statute strictly to allow management the freedom to alter sub-
stantially the allocation of authority between management and
shareholders that is reflected in the remainder of the statute and in
the structure of the corporation. This commitment to contractual
freedom for public corporations stands in sharp contrast to the
courts' historical approach to problems of close corporations. Efforts
by shareholders of these corporations to organize their enterprises in
ways that conflict with the statutory allocation of authority-for ex-
ample, by shifting the locus of decisionmaking from directors to
shareholders-were too often struck down in reliance on the same
statutory literalism.222 The courts never recognized that strict appli-
cation of the corporate statute resulted in different amounts of defer-
ence to the concept of contractual freedom. As a consequence, it was
difficult to discern a consistent approach to accommodating the stat-
ute's language and philosophy.
The conflict in the primacy given the value of freedom of con-
tract despite similar methods of statutory construction-in each case
reaching the wrong result-derives from failing to consider the stat-
ute as only one part of the corporate structure and, therefore, failing
to appreciate the fundamental differences between the structures of
the entities under consideration. Supermajority vote requirements-
the critical element of shark repellent amendments-provide an ex-
ample of this methodological failure.
I have argued that these provisions serve no justifiable role in the
public corporation.223 Maximization of the corporation's profits by
management best serves both society's interest in an efficient alloca-
tion of resources and the interests of the corporation's shareholders.
Shark repellent amendments are invalid because they shelter man-
agement from the discipline of an important market mechanism en-
couraging profit maximization. In contrast, the structure of a close
corporation allows for a beneficial role for supermajority provisions
222. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, sutfra note 207, at 424-41 (tracing judicial response
to shareholder agreements controlling discretion of board of directors); see also F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.13 (1971); Hornstein, supra note 144; Manne, supra note 144, at
283.
223. See text accompanying notes 173-92 supra.
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even though they facilitate what, in a public corporation, would be
nonmaximizing arrangements.
In the private setting, a critical premise of the structure of the
public corporation-that both society and the shareholder are best
served by maximizing the entiys profit-is simply incorrect. The ac-
curacy of that premise depends on whether the only effect of the cor-
poration's decisions on the shareholder is in the value of the firm. If
that is so, shareholders will prefer profit maximization because, by
definition, deviation from it can ony make them worse off.224 While
presumably satisfied in public corporations, this condition is clearly
not satisfied in close corporations. Lawyers working with close corpo-
rations recognize that maximizing the shareholders' profit may not be
the same as maximizing the corporation's profit; for example, employ-
ing a shareholder's brother-in-law, even if not an efficient decision,
may provide more utility to the shareholder than the corporate in-
come forgone because of hiring a less productive employee. In that
setting, deviation from profit maximization should not presumptively
raise the specter of misallocation of resources. Because of the ease of
direct bargaining in private corporations-I'll take your brother-in-
law if you take mine-the result can be expected to reflect actual
shareholder desires. The use of supermajority provisions to assure the
continuity of such bargains is thus beneficial.225
This example illustrates that the structures of public and private
corporations are fundamentally different.2 26 But the differences are
significant only if the corporate enabling statute is construed in struc-
tural terms: how the statute should mesh with the nonstatutory rela-
tionships-market and others-which together determine the
behavior of the entity, and which differ depending on whether the
corporation in question is public, private, or somewhere in
224. See DeAngelo, Competition and Unanimity, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 18, 23-24 (1981);
Hirschleifer & Riley, supra note 196, at 1393-94; see also Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 196,
at 394.
225. Prior to the adoption of specific enabling legislation of the sort relied upon in Culton
Industries, see text accompanying notes 144-53 supra, courts often relied upon the literal terms
of the corporate statute to strike down supermajority requirements. See, e.g., Benintendi v.
Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945); see generall W. CARY & M. EISEN-
BERG, supra note 207, at 453-60.
226. The courts, of course, have reached results consistent with this conclusion, albeit
without careful articulation of their method of statutory interpretation. These results are
considered in detail by Professor Karjala in a recent article arguing that judicial performance
under general corporate statutes has reached a level such that separate close corporation stat-
utes are no longer necessary. See Kaijala, A Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legilation,
58 TEx. L. REv. 1207 (1980). One does encounter occasional throwbacks, however. See




A structural approach thus provides a method of coherently dif-
ferentiating between types of corporations for purposes of interpret-
ing the corporate enabling statute.228 Freedom of contract-the
touchstone of the enabling concept-should be paramount in the pri-
vate corporation setting. In the public corporation setting, the re-
quirement of profit maximization and the existence of important
market constraints on managerial behavior provide a basis for princi-
ples that appropriately limit freedom of contract. The same statute,
in different settings, should yield different results, and the differences
result not from the statutory language, but from principles derived
from the nonstatutory aspects of the corporate structure.229
227. There has been increasing recognition that the quasi-public corporation-one with
a dominant shareholder but with a public minority-presents problems different from those
presented by either of the traditional corporate models. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, fi.ra note
46, at 275-316; Brudney & Clark,A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 997,
1045-60 (1981); Knauss, Corporate ,oaeance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH L. REv. 479-87
(1981). In the context of this discussion, maximizing the dominant shareholder's profit may
be different from maximizing the entity's profit, while entity profit maximization would be
preferable for the public shareholders.
228. An approach of this sort is reflected in the recent efforts of Professors Brudney &
Clark, supra note 227, to rationalize the corporate opportunity doctrine by explicitly distin-
guishing between three classes of corporations on the basis of what I have called structural
attributes.
229. A structural approach to statutory construction should also allow making
somewhat finer distinctions. While structural elements dictate a general limit on the range of
freedom of contract in a public corporation, there may be some circumstances which nonethe-
less justify individual variation. Conflicts between classes of stock within a public corporation
provide an illustration of this.
A common statutory pattern gives nonvoting preferred stock the right to vote on the
acquisition of the corporation by merger, if the proposed merger will alter the rights, prefer-
ences, and privileges of the preferred. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a) (West 1975 &
Supp. 1981). The preferred is given no role, however, in business decisions concerning acqui-
sition of assets by the corporation, regardless of the transaction's impact on preferred. The
question is whether a corporation's articles of incorporation may prohibit the corporation
from acquiring more than a specified amount of assets without preferred approval. The stat-
ute itself typically provides no clear resolution. But see id. § 204(a)(9) (authorizing charter
provision requiring shareholder approval for any corporate action even if not required by the
statute). On the one hand, the statutory allocation of decisionmaking authority gives pre-
ferred stockholders no role in such decisions; indeed, the statute largely limits even common
holders to influencing these choices through their power to elect directors. On the other
hand, the typical statute also offers a blanket invitiation to "any provision creating, defining,
limiting and regulating the power of. . . any class of stockholders. . . if such provisions are
not contrary to the laws of this State." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (1975); see ABA-
ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 54(h) (1971).
A structural analysis suggests that this contractual alteration in the statutory allocation
of decisionmaking authority is valid even in a public corporation. While the presence of mar-
ket incentives which reinforce management's obligation to maximize profit on behalf of the




Shark repellent amendments pose two challenges for a structural
sions, see Gilson, supra note 2, at 833-45, those same incentives justify allowing preferred
shareholders to bargain for a broader role. Indeed, profit maximization-a cornerstone of the
structure of the public corporation-is precisely what the preferred shareholders require pro-
tection against.
For this purpose, assume a class of preferred which has a fixed dividend and liquidation
preference, and a right to elect a majority of the directors if preferred dividends are not paid.
See Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and raftmarnshi, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 290-98 (1954).
The rights of the common shareholders then approximate a form of call option: the right to
acquire an asset at a specified price. If the value of the corporation exceeds the present value
of the preferred dividends, those dividends will be paid and the common will thus exercise its
option to "keep" the corporation; if it does not, dividends will not be paid and the preferred
holders will take control and run the corporation for their own advantage. See general Black
& Scholes, The ricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. PoL. ECON. 637 (1973). The
factors that determine the value of the common shareholder's option demonstrate that profit
maximization from the perspective of the common works to the disadvantage of the preferred.
Research into the determinants of option pricing has shown that, other things being equal,
the value of a call option increases with the variability in the value of the asset subject to the
option. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 433-41
(1981); J. VAN HORNE, supra note 32, at 80-98. The intuition underlying this relationship is
that while greater variability in potential value increases both the option holder's potential
gain and loss relative to the exercise price, the gain is unlimited, while the loss cannot exceed
the price paid for the option; if the underlying asset is worth less than the exercise price, the
option holder simply will not exercise it, thereby limiting the loss to the cost of the option.
In this context, the price paid for the option is the common's investment, and the exercise
price is the preferred's dividend, which is set to reflect the market's evaluation of the variabil-
ity in the corporation's value. It should be apparent that once the terms of the option have
been set--once the preferred stock is issued at a specified dividend rate--the common has an
incentive to increase the variability of the corporation's future value. The resulting increase
in potential value goes entirely to the common because the preferred's return is fixed, while
the preferred participates in the increase in potential loss. The upshot is that the value of the
common is increased and the value of the preferred is decreased.
In short, the common shareholders and their representatives, management, have an in-
centive to make the corporation's business more risky-to increase the range of future val-
ues-once a fixed preferred dividend has been issued. One way to accomplish this is by
reinvesting funds previously committed to low risk investments in riskier assets. This, of
course, is precisely the type of transaction that the hypothetical charter provision would pro-
hibit without preferred consent, and it presents the same problem lenders have responded to
through the use of bond covenants. Se, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, Secured F'nancing andfiod-
ties Among Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143, 1149-58 (1979); Smith & Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 125-31 (1979).
A structural approach to the problem of statutory construction would thus allow such a
charter provision. The combination of market incentives to maximize the value of the com-
mon stock, and the statutory allocation of decisionmaking power, which together justify the
general restriction of freedom of contract in a public corporation, in this setting create incen-
tives for the common to make choices that disadvantage the preferred. Recognition of these
nonstatutory influences counsels in favor of allowing the preferred to protect themselves by
bargaining for limits on the ability of those representing common shareholders to behave
opportunistically.
It is worth noting that this analysis explains otherwise cryptic references in the legislative
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approach to corporations: whether such an approach can deal with
the seemingly express statutory authorization of the critical aspect of
the shark repellent approach, and whether that effort yields broader
insights into the value of a structural approach to construction of the
corporate statute. On a specific level, I think that structural analysis
clearly demonstrates that the corporate statute should be construed
not to authorize shark repellent amendments-provisions that are in
direct conflict with the allocation of authority between management
and shareholders reflected in the structure of the modern public cor-
poration. Gulton is simply wrong. On a more general level, a struc-
tural approach provides a coherent approach to limiting the broad
invitation to private ordering reflected in the enabling form of corpo-
rate legislation. Focusing on such nonstatutory aspects of the corpo-
rate structure as the congruence between maximizing shareholder
wealth and maximizing corporate profits promises to be an attractive
alternative to the statutory myopia exemplified by decisions like Prov-
idence & Worcester.
history of statutory provisions like DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1975) to their value in
public corporations. See note 153 suira.
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